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HEADQUARTERS
Task Group 79.4
FPO, San Francisco, California 96602

3/GWE/rgf
5750.1C
SerNo: 0046A68
16 January 1968

0013969

NOFORN (Unclassified upon removal of enclosures (1) and (2))

From: Commander
To: Distribution List

Subj: CTG 79.4 Command Chronology for the Period 1 November 1967 through
30 November 1967

Ref: (a) CTG 79.4 Command Chronology for the period 1 November 1967
through 30 November 1967, SerNo: 00360A67 dtd 26 December 1967

Encl: (1) BLT 1/3 Combat After Action Report (Operation GRANITE), *26 Oct 4 Nov 67*
(2) BLT 1/3 Combat After Action Report (Operation KENTUCKY, Phase
II and III). *6-16 Nov 67*

1. Enclosures (1) and (2) are supporting documents for reference (a) and
are to be inserted in reference (a) immediately behind TAB B.

[Signature]
P. H. SIMPSON
By direction

CTG 79.4

DISTRIBUTION LIST:

- CG, 9thMAB (2)
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ENCLOSURE (1)

HEADQUARTERS
Battalion Landing Team 1/3
9th Marine Amphibious Brigade
FPO, San Francisco 96602

3/PDF/jcb
5050
6 November 1967

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding Officer, Headquarters, 4th Marines, 3rd Marine Division (Rein),
FMF

Subj: Combat After Action Report (Operation GRANITE)

- Ref: (a) 4th Marines OPORD 100-67
- (b) 4th Marines Frag Order #1 for Operation GRANITE
- (c) BLT 1/3 Frag Order #1 for Operation GRANITE
- (d) Maps: Vietnam 1:50,000, Series L7014 Sheets 6441 I and 6442 II

1. Code Name. GRANITE, Search and Destroy Operation
2. Dates and Location of Operation. 26 October 1967 through 4 November 1967.
Tinh Thua Thien Province RVN.
3. Command Headquarters. Headquarters, 4th Marines, 3rd Marine Division (Rein),
FMF.

SUBORDINATE UNITS

U&S Company

Captain MACK

Company A

Captain LARIMORE

Company B

1st Bn, 3d Mar S & C No. 00468-67
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Captain LANDES

Company C

Captain OSGOOD

Company D

Captain RICHARDSON

4. Task Organization

BLT 1/3 (-)

Lt Col THOMAS

H&S Co (-) (Rein)

Captain MACK

H&S Co (-)

Det Btry A, 1st Bn, 12th Marines (LnTm)

Lt JOHNSON

1st Clearing Plat (Rein) Co B

3d Med Bn

Lt KANTER (USN)

ENCLOSURE (1)

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Det 15th Dental Co

1st Plat (-) Co B 3d Recon Bn

Co A (Rein)

Co A

FC Tm Btry A, 1st Bn 12th Mar

Det 2d Plat (Rein) Co A, 3d Engr Bn

Det 2d Plat (Rein) Co B, 3d SF Bn (HST)

Det H&S Co

Det Intel Sect

Det Med Plat

Det Comm Plat

Co B (Rein)

Co B

FC Tm Btry A, 1st Bn 12th Mar

Det 2d Plat (Rein) Co A, 3d Engr Bn

Det 2d Plat (Rein) Co B, 3d SF Bn (HST)

Det H&S Co

Det Intel Sect

Det Med Plat

Det Comm Plat

Co C (Rein)

Co C

FC Tm Btry A, 1st Bn 12th Mar

Det 2d Plat (Rein) Co A, 3d Engr Bn

Det 2d Plat (Rein) Co B, 3d SF Bn (HST)

Det H&S Co

Det Intel Sect

Det Med Plat

Lt McGINN (USN)

Lt ANTLE

Capt LAMERIE

Capt LANDES

Capt OSGOOD

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Det Comm Flat

Co D (Rein)

Capt RICHARDSON

Co D

FO Tm Btry A, 1stBn 12th Mar

Det 2d Flat (Rein) Co A, 3d Engr Bn

Det 2d Flat (Rein) Co B, 3d SF Bn (HST)

Det H&S Co

Det Intel Sect

Det Med Flat

Det Comm Flat

2d Flat (-) (Rein) Co A, 3d Engr Bn

Lt GARDNER

2d Flat, Co A, 3d Engr Bn

Det H&S Co, 3d Engr Bn

Det Engr Supt Co, 3d Engr Bn

2d Flat (-) (Rein) Co B, 3d SF Bn

Lt WYMER

2d Flat Co B, 3d SF Bn

Det H&S Co, 3d SF Bn

4th Flat (Rein) Co A, 5th Amtrac Bn

Lt KAUFMAN

4th Flat Co A, 5th Amtrac Bn

Det H&S Co, 5th Amtrac Bn

3d Flat (Rein) Co C, 3d Tank Bn

Lt BUCKLEY

3d Flat Co C, 3d Tank Bn

Det H&S Co, 3d Tank Bn

1st Flat (-) Co B, 3d Recon Bn

Lt ANGLE

5. Supporting Forcesa. Artillery

(1) The Battalion was furnished direct support artillery by Btry A, 1stBn 12th Marines located at coordinates 493293.

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(2) General Support reinforcing fires were furnished by G-3-12 and the 1st Prov 155 Battery Detachment. Additional general support reinforcing fires were available from H-3-12 and the 2nd Prov 155 Battery Detachment.

(3) Ammunition Expenditures:

4600 HE

280 WP

390 Illum

1 Smoke

(4) Missions Fired

Observed 82

Unobserved 74

H & I 496

(5) The 81mm Mortar Platoon also provided the battalion with fire support, shooting on-call missions and close-in H & I's.

b. Air Support

(1) During the operation, fifty-nine sorties of fixed wing were utilized with a BDA being generally unobtainable due to the dense vegetation and high canopy. UH-1E's were used on four fire suppression sorties.

(2) Eight emergency or priority medevac missions extracted twelve medevacs. Routine medevacs were evacuated on the resupply helicopters. The time element for medevac missions was lengthened due to the fact there were few landing zones in the area and the medevacs had to be carried to a suitable landing zone.

6. Intelligence.

a. Throughout the operation the enemy continuously harassed BLT 1/3 (-) by staying within a few hundred meters from the front lines. Night probes were made with a consistency not normally experienced with the VC/NVA. The contact made by Company B on 29 October 1967 was believed to be the outer perimeter defense of a much larger force. The enemy was well dug-in in fighting holes and bunkers. Weapons used in this perimeter defense were entirely automatic weapons.

7. Mission. BLT 1/3 (-) on D-1 provide one reinforced company as a regimental reserve. At L-Hour, D-Day conduct a helicopterborne assault to seize and secure Landing Zone Buzzard (VIC YD 465217). Upon reorganization conduct search and destroy operations toward objective B (VIC YD 485218). On order conduct search and destroy operations toward objective D. Bn Btry A,

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1st En 12th Bar at forward artillery position (VIC 48 491289) on D-Day. Security to be provided by 1st Bn, 4th Marines.

Regimental Reserve. Company C (Rein), 1st Bn, 3d Marines (-). Commanded H-Hour, D-Day be prepared (on 30 minute alert) for employment in either battalion zone of action.

6. Execution. At 261155 Company B commenced heliborne assault into LZ Mallard (VIC 470237) and secured the landing zone. The BnF element led in LZ Mallard for the night and at first light the next morning continued the attack and secured battalion objective 1 at 1300 on 27 October 1967. All companies conducted search and destroy operations in the vicinity of battalion objective 1 at 280730-H. Company A and Company B commenced attack to seize regimental objective B with Company C, Company D and the Co and Group following in trace. BLT 1/3 (-) conducted search and destroy operations in and around objective B and on the 29th started search and destroy operations toward objective F (VIC 48 495215). On 3 November 1967 BLT 1/3 (-) started withdrawing from the objective area. The withdrawal was accomplished by keeping 2 units on the high ground while the remaining units moved through the valleys. The operation ended with a tactical march from the foothills to a designated pickup point.

a. Chronological Sequence of Events

- 260730H Operation GRANITE commenced by BLT 1/3
 271115H Companies A & B secured objective 1 at coordinates 476243. 1 USMC WIA sustained.
 280945H Co B platoon received automatic weapons fire at coordinates 463222. Platoon fired 60mm Mortar Mission with negative results. 1 USMC KIA, 2 WIA, and 4 WIA (NE) were sustained.
 281405H Companies A & B secured objective B.
 290910H A patrol from Co B spotted 4 VC with weapons moving towards their position at coord. 465221. A 60mm Mortar Mission was fired resulting in 1 VC KIA probable.
 290930H Co B spotted 4 NVA with weapons at coord. 481216. Fired automatic weapons and small arms at NVA. 1 KIA confirmed, 1 AK-47 and 2 chicom grenades were captured.
 291130H Co B suffered 2 USMC WIA when an air strike hit their position at coord. 481217.
 291450H A patrol from Co B received 50 to 60 rounds automatic weapons fire at coord. 482217, the patrol returned fire and called an Artillery mission with negative results, 1 USMC WIA and 1 WIA (NE).
 291630H A platoon from Co D made contact with 10 VC at coord. 476229. Exchanged small arms fire and fired 60mm Mortar Mission. 2 USMC WIA were sustained.
 291815h An LP from Co B spotted 4 VC at coord. 476229. Called 60mm Mortar Mission. 1 USMC WIA resulted from a short 60mm Mortar round.
 300230H Co B had 2 USMC WIA from friendly artillery round at coordinates 479219.

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- 300500H Co B received a light enemy probe with one incoming grenade. Called for illumination. Nothing could be seen. No casualties.
- 301110H A patrol from Co A spotted 4 VC at coordinates 487277. In exchange of small arms fire resulted in 1 KIA(confirmed), 1 KIA(probable), and 1 USMC KIA was sustained. One M16 7.62 carbine was captured.
- 301140H A Co B patrol received heavy automatic weapons fire at coordinates 483218. The patrol called an artillery mission resulting in 2 KIA(probable), no friendly casualties.
- 301330H Friendly aircraft was making strafing run on a suspected enemy position at coordinates 482229 when a shell casing fell on a man from Co B resulting in 1 USMC KIA(NE).
- 310930H Co A received automatic weapons fire at coordinates 486230, resulting in 2 USMC KIA(NE).
- 311300H Co D patrol received automatic weapons fire from coordinates 474237. Fired 81mm Mortar Mission resulting in 5 KIA(probable) 2 USMC KIA (NE).
- 311320H Co D patrol received small arms fire and incoming 60mm Mortar Mission at coordinates 470238. Returned small arms fire and called air and artillery. 1 USMC KIA was sustained.
- 311345H Co B lead elements made contact with an NVA patrol. In exchange of small arms resulted in 1 KIA(confirmed), and 2 AK-47 captured. 4 USMC KIA were sustained. Coordinates 482215.
- 312105H Co D LP observed 3 VC through a starlight scope. Fired machine gun fire. 3 KIA(probable). Coordinates 475229.
- 010630H Co B started moving to join Co D, Co C, and the command group at coordinates 475227.
- 011100H Co A started moving to join Co D, Co C, Co B and command group.
- 011130H Co C and Co B commenced attack to secure regimental objective B.
- 011405H Recon elements located at 478226 spotted a 4 man NVA patrol moving North on trail at 479225. Recon opened fire with small arms and confirmed 1 NVA KIA and claimed 1 probable KIA.
- 011910H Co C secured regimental objective B.
- 012240H Co D joined Co C on regimental objective B.
- 020800H Co A, Co B and command group started movement out of objective area.
- 021815H Co B at 486243 received 8 rounds of 60mm Mortar from 492239. Counter Mortar fire was returned with small arms and 81mm Mortar. 1 USMC KIA (NE) was sustained.

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030810H Control from Co B at 479239 was hit by automatic weapons fire. Small arms fire was returned and 81mm Mortars and artillery were called with negative results.

031200H Co A, Co B, and command group continued movement out of objective area with Co C on high ground to left at coordinates 482241 and 470243, and Co D on high ground to the right at coordinate 486244.

031320H Recon at 486241 while screening the rear of the BLT was hit with automatic weapons fire. Fire was returned with artillery and small arms results unknown. The recon unit sustained 1 USMC KIA.

031520H Co D spotted 30-40 NVA in the open VIC 486240. A coordinated artillery, 60mm Mortar and automatic weapons mission was fired which resulted in 10 NVA KIA confirmed and 15 probables were claimed.

040817H Continued movement out of the objective area.

041530H Lead elements reached entrucking point (coordinate 503286) and commenced shuttle movement to Camp Evans.

041735H All units in Camp Evans and Operation GRANITE secured.

9. Results

a. Enemy Losses

17 KIA confirmed

28 KIA probable

b. Weapons Captured

5 AK-47 rifles

c. Equipment Captured

12 Chicom grenades

2 NVA packs

8 rounds 81mm Mortar ammunition

1 Cartridge belt

1 Pair binoculars

12 AK-47 Banana clips

1 Green web NVA NCO's belt

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1 Brown leather officers belt with bayonet and scabbard.

Miscellaneous documents and medical supplies.

d. Friendly Losses

3 KIA

24 WIA

e. Friendly Equipment Lost or Destroyed

None

10. Administrative Matters

- a. Postal. Mail was delivered to the BIF rear aboard ship and at Phu Bai; sorted and delivered to the field regularly.
- b. Logistics. Unit resupply of all classes of supply was effected by helicopter from the 4th Marines LSA at Camp Evans. No difficulties were encountered other than limited helicopter availability which upon several occasions resulted in the problem of Logistical Support being a major consideration in tactical planning.
- c. Treatment of Casualties and Evacuation. Casualties were evacuated to the USS Okinawa, and to Camp Evans 4th Marines dispensary and to "A" Med at Phu Bai. Terrain, vegetation and weather posed difficulties on medevacs; primarily in locating and clearing satisfactory Landing Zones.
- d. Communications. Radio relay teams were established on Hill #674 to provide good communications with no difficulties encountered.

11. Commander's Analysis

During the initial heliborne assault there was an unacceptable amount of confusion in the pickup zone and the landing zone. The confusion was caused by the fact that the pickup zone control officer did not know where the helicopters were going to land and he did not know how many troops each flight of helicopters would take. The landing zone was long and the build up in the landing zone was too fast. The large number of troops scattered over a large long area (approx. 800meters) caused the loss of tactical integrity. This is unacceptable during an assault landing. The problems were caused primarily by the large number of helicopters, 4 UH-10's, 30 UH-34's, 4 CH 53's and the variance of troop loads.

It is recommended that in future mass heliborne assaults, less helicopters be used and that the heliteam be standardized to five men.

art coordination between artillery and helicopters was unsatisfactory. The problem was that helicopters continuously flew across the trajectory of the artillery rounds causing a check fire. It is

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recommended that helicopter approach and retirement lanes be established for each operation and that helicopters be required to strictly follow these established lanes.

No significant problems due to the nature of the terrain were encountered that were not anticipated.

A. I. Thomas
A. I. THOMAS

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HEADQUARTERS
Task Group 79.4
FPO, San Francisco, California 96602

3/JE/jrs
5750
Ser: 363A67
29 December 1967

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From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, Ninth Marine Amphibious Brigade
Subj: BLT 1/3 Command Chronology for period 16-27 November 1967
Ref: Your 270756Z Dec67

1. Continuous operational commitments and the battle loss of the BLT Operations Officer have precluded the submission of the subject Command Chronology.
2. In accordance with the reference, Task Group 79.4 Command Chronology is submitted without that of BLT 1/3. BLT 1/3 Command Chronology will be forwarded upon receipt.


JOHN A. CONWAY

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HEADQUARTERS
Battalion Landing Team 1/3
9th Marine Amphibious Brigade
FPO, San Francisco 96602

ENCLOSURE (2)
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3/PED/GGL
5050
14 NOVEMBER 1967

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, 3rd Marine Division

Via: Commanding Officer, 9th Marines

Subj: Combat Operations After Action Report

Ref: (a) 9th Marine Regiment Frag O #2 for operation KENTUCKY
(b) 9th Marine Regiment Frag O #3 for Operation KENTUCKY
(c) MAPS: VIETNAM 1: 50,000, Series L7014 Sheets 6342 I and 6442 IV
(1) Overlay to Operation KENTUCKY

1. Code Name. Operation KENTUCKY, Phase II and Phase III.
2. Dates and Location of Operation. 6 NOVEMBER 1967 through 16 NOVEMBER 1967. QUANG TRI PROVINCE RVN.
3. COMMAND HEADQUARTERS. HEADQUARTERS, 9th MARINES, 3rd MARINE DIVISION (REIN), FMP.
4. Task Organization.

BLT 1/3

H&S Co (-) Rein

- H&S Co (-)
- Det Btry A, 1st Bn 12th Mar (Ln Tm)
- 81mm Mortar Plat
- 1st Clearing Plat (Rein) CoB 3rd Med Bn
- Det 15th Dental Co
- 1st Plat (-) CoB 3rd Recon Bn

LtCol THOMAS
Capt LARIMORE

Lt JOHNSON
Lt PARKER
Lt KAMBER (USN)
Lt OLIVER (USN)
Lt ANTLE

Co A (Rein)

- Co A
- FO Tm Btry A 1st Bn 12th Mar
- Det 2nd Plat Co B 3rd SPBn (HST)
- Det 2nd Plat Co A 3rd Engr Bn
- Det H&S Co
- Det Intel Sect
- Det Comm Plat
- Det Med Plat
- Det TACP

Capt HANCOCK

1stBn, 3dMar B & C No. 00470-67
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ENCLOSURE (2)

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Co B (Rein)

Co B

- FO Tm Btry A 1st Bn 12th Mar
- Det 2nd Plat Co B 3rd SPBn (HST)
- Det 2nd Plat Co A 3rd Engr Bn
- Det H&S Co
 - Det Intel Sect
 - Det Comm Plat
 - Det Med Plat
 - Det TACP

Capt SCHEIB

Co C (Rein)

Co C

- FO Tm Btry A 1st Bn 12th Mar
- Det 2nd Plat Co B 3rd SPBn (HST)
- Det 2nd Plat Co A 3rd Engr Bn
- Det H&S Co
 - Det Intel Sect
 - Det Comm Plat
 - Det Med Plat
 - Det TACP

Capt OSGOOD

Co D (Rein)

Co D

- FO Tm Btry A 1st Bn 12th Mar
- Det 2nd Plat Co B 3rd SPBn (HST)
- Det 2nd Plat Co A 3rd Engr Bn
- Det H&S Co
 - Det Intel Sect
 - Det Comm rlat
 - Det Med Plat
 - Det TACP

Capt RICHARDSON

2nd Plat (-) (Rein) Co B 3rd SP BN

- 2nd Plat Co B 3rd SP Bn
- Det H&S Co, 3rd SP Bn

Lt WYMER

2nd Plat (-) (Rein)

- 2nd Plat Co A 3rd Engr Bn
- Det H&S Co 3rd Engr Bn
- Det Engr Supt Co, 3rd Engr Bn

Lt GARDNER

Btry A (-) (Rein) 1st Bn 12th Marines

Capt KENYON

1st Plat (-) (Rein) Co B 3rd MLI Bn

Lt BYSTED

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5. Supporting Forces.

- a. Artillery. Both direct and general support artillery fires were available to the BLT during Operation KENTUCKY, phase II and III. Btry A, 1st Bn 12th Marines located at 137642 provided direct support fires for the BLT. Additional direct support fires were delivered by W Btry 3rd Bn 12th Marines located at Con Thien, when A/1/12 ran low on fuses. General support reinforcing fires were not used.

Ammunition Expenditure

126 rds HE
8 rds WP
3 rds Illum

Missions Fired

6 Observed
0 Unobserved
All H&I's were fired by regiment

- b. 81mm Mortars. The 81mm Mortar Platoon provided additional direct support fires for the BLT and accomplished the following:

Ammunition Expenditure

26 rds HE
1 rd WP
1 rd Illum

Missions Fired

4 observed
0 unobserved
0 H&I's

- c. Air Support. During the operation two command and control flights were utilized to gain tactical information concerning troop movement and disposition, and to study the terrain in the operating area.

On 10 and 11 November an AO was on station during the daylight hours, and was used to check specific coordinates, provide a general reconnaissance of the operating area, and to control fixed wing. Four sorties of fixed wing and two UH-1E Gun Ships were used in direct support of the BLT. Additionally, numerous flights of fixed wing in direct support of other units were coordinated through BLT one slant three A.L.O.

6. INTELLIGENCE. The enemy was well dug in, in bunkers in the objective areas. During the encounter at 110900H on objective B, the enemy let most of the elements of one Company pass through their positions, and then opened fire on the Company Commander and his two radio operators. It is considered most probable that the enemy was surprised, as the Company swept through from the blind or the east side of the positions, and realizing he was trapped picked

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on the most likely target to destroy before he himself was destroyed or captured.

The bunkers were well constructed of logs and dirt, and would accommodate one or two men. The fields of fire were mutually supporting, but observation was generally restricted to the front of the positions, facing south.

In the encounter at 111500H near objective D, the bunkers were similarly constructed, but the enemy was not surprised. However the enemy did fail to open fire on the assaulting troops soon enough, and was trapped and killed before inflicting many casualties.

One wounded POW was captured in the second encounter, and in preliminary interrogation revealed information concerning his mission, unit location and future intentions. He claimed to be a squad leader in an infantry battalion which had been operating in the area for about one month.

Assorted documents and propaganda leaflets were captured and forwarded to regiment. Included among the documents was a list of squad members and unit identification. The propaganda leaflets were the same, all containing a statement by Bertrand Russell asking U.S. troops not to fight in Viet Nam. The leaflets were published by the National Liberation Front.

The enemy employed sporadic 82mm and 60mm mortar fire against the advancing columns of the BLT on 11 November 1967.

All the NVA KIA's were by body count and were confirmed kills.

7. Mission. From 6 through 9 November 67, and from 12 to 16 November 67, BLT 1/3 had the mission of Division Reserve. On 10 November 67 BLT 1/3 was directed to move to an attack position vicinity YD 133702 just short of the trace. At H-Hour on D-day attack to the north across the trace to seize objective B. Following seizure of objective B, attack west and seize objectives D and H. Following seizure of objective H, on order, withdraw to base Southeast and occupy assembly area vicinity 123664.

8. Execution. BLT 1/3 occupied defensive positions in the vicinity of C-3 from 6 through 9 November 67 as Division Reserve. On 10 and 11 November 67, the BLT moved with two up and two back to the attack position, and utilized the same formation during the assault on objectives B, D and E. The 81mm mortar platoon provided direct support fires from a static position at Yankee Station near Con Thien. The withdrawal from the assigned assembly area at C-3 to Dong Ha was by tactical motor march. BLT 1/3 remained Division Reserve while at Dong Ha until 0900 16 November 67. The BLT was on 30 minute notice for possible commitment from 121900H until 160900H November 1967.

a. Chronological Sequence of Events

061130H BLT chopped Op Con from 4th Marines to 9th Marines
 061205H Units of BLT 1/3 have arrived at Cam Lo
 061850H Company C heard movement in front of their lines at coord 135620. They fired 2 rounds of small arms fire and threw 2 M-26 grenades with negative results.

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061900H All unit positions are the same, coord. 136620.

062100F A Company C listening post reported 1 mortar round of an unknown size landing 200 meters west of coord. 136620.

071900H All unit positions are the same, coord. 136620.

071945H Company A ambush patrol observed 2 VC moving north from coord. 133618. The patrol opened fire with small arms and threw 1 M-26 grenade. After receiving 1 incoming grenade, the patrol saw 1 VC being dragged away. They opened fire again and later swept the area with negative results. 1 VC KIA probable was credited.

081900H All unit positions are the same, coord. 136620.

091020H Company A patrol received 1 incoming chicom grenade from a VC at coord. 125624. The patrol returned fire with M-16's and 2 M-79 rounds and swept the area with negative results.

091900H All unit positions are the same, coord. 136620.

092210H Company B had movement on their left flank at coord. 140619. They threw grenades and fired several rounds of M-16 with negative results.

092245H A message was received from the 9th Marines concerning the move to coord. 133702 starting at 0600 the 10th of November.

100745H BLT 1/3 is on the move to reach the attack position at coord. 133702.

101805H Company A sustained 1 Marine WIA at coord. 133694 from a short artillery round.

101900H All unit positions are the same, coord. 140692.

110830H Company D while attacking regimental objective B was taken under fire at point blank range by automatic and semiautomatic small arms fire. The NVA were in well concealed bunkers and numbered approximately a platoon. Elements of Company D returned fire and accounted for 7 KIA conf. They also captured 6 individual weapons, 26-60mm mortar rounds, 2 chicom grenades, 1 AP mine, numerous items of equipment and assorted documents. Company D sustained 1 KIA and 15 WIA.

110930H Objective B secured by Company D.

111030H Company A discovered a NVA manufactured mine at coord. 125714. The mine was disarmed and sent to S-2.

111120H Company A located a bunker at coord. 124714. Upon searching it 15 82mm mortar rounds, 2 RPG containers, and 25 "00" shotgun shells were found. Everything was blown in place.

111500H Company B searched a tunnel complex at coord. 122712 with negative results. The tunnel was destroyed by C-4.

111545H Company D while attacking through objective D made contact with an estimated squad of NVA well dug in. They physically assaulted the NVA positions and killed 6 and captured 1 PW. They also captured 3 rifles, 1 light machinegun, 4 chicom grenades, numerous items of equipment and assorted documents. Company D suffered 1 Marine KIA and 1 WIA.

111600H Objective D secured by company D.

111715H Objective E secured by company D.

111900H All unit positions are the same, coord. 123686.

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120845H BLT 1/3 received message from 9th Marines concerning a truck movement to Dong Ha.
 121345H BLT 1/3 moved out on a tactical footmarch to C-3.
 121645H BLT 1/3 arrived at C-3.
 121845H BLT 1/3 departed C-3 for Dong Ha.
 122000H BLT 1/3 arrived at Dong Ha
 131900H All units of BLT 1/3 were in Dong Ha.
 140800H BLT 1/3 designated as Regimental reserve for Phase III of Operation KENTUCKY II. Company B provided a reactionary element for the 9th MARINES.
 141900H All units of BLT 1/3 were in Dong Ha.
 151900H All units of BLT 1/3 were in Dong Ha.
 160900H BLT 1/3 chopped from the 9th MARINES and reverted to CTG 79.4. BLT 1/3 has TERMINATED it's part in OPERATION KENTUCKY II.

9. Resultsa. Enemy Losses

14 KIA CONFIRMED (1 confirmed as a result of AIRSTRIKES-BDA 11 November 1967)
 7 KIA probable (6 probables as a result of AIRSTRIKES-BDA 11 November 1967)
 1 NVA PW

b. Weapons Captured

4 AK-47 Assault Rifles
 5 SKS Carbines
 1 RPD Machinegun

c. Equipment Captured

26 60mm Mortar Rounds
 6 chicom grenades
 2 AP Mines
 1 AT Mine
 1 3.57 in. RR Round
 6 AK-47 Magazines fully loaded
 1 Belt RPD MG Ammo
 9 Clips SKS Carbine Ammo
 1 Machete
 2 Gas Masks
 15 82mm Mortar Rounds
 25 Rounds "00" Shotgun Shells
 Assorted clothing
 Assorted 782 gear
 Propaganda leaflets
 Assorted documents

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d. FRIENDLY LOSSES

3 KIA (1 WIA died before the operation terminated)
 12 WIA
 4 WIA (NE)

e. FRIENDLY EQUIPMENT LOST OR DESTROYED

1 AN/PRC-25 Radio destroyed.

10. ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS.

a. POSTAL. Mail was delivered while BLT 1/3 was in a reserved posture.

b. LOGISTICS. Logistical Support was provided from the established LSA Dong Ha on D-1 Via resupply trucks. An additional meal per individual was obtained on D-day and delivered to BLT 1/3 Via LVTP. Only class V and limited Class II priority resupply was effected. No particular problems or difficulties were encountered.

c. TREATMENT of CASUALTIES AND EVACUATION. All Casualties/Casualty Equipment were evacuated to Co. D 1st Med Bn Dong Ha. Casualty reports were relayed through the LSA Dong Ha to the BLT 1/3 Rear Via land line or radio.

d. COMMUNICATIONS. Logistic communications were effected via HST nets. Communications overall was excellent particularly considering the wet weather conditions encountered.


11. COMMANDER'S ANALYSIS. The successful completion of BLT 1/3's assigned mission, to seize objectives B, D and E was due to several factors.

- a. Adequate dispersion so as not to offer a desirable artillery, mortar or rocket target.
- b. Use of appropriate formations in relation to the terrain and changing situations, to ensure all round security.
- c. Immediate aggressive reaction by the fire teams and squads when taken under fire.
- d. Adherence to the sound basic principles of offensive tactics.
- e. Timely and proper employment of supporting arms.


A. I. Thomas
 A. I. THOMAS

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Ref: (a) Map: Viet Nam, 1:50,000,
Sheets 6342 I and 6442



COORD
C-2 BRIDGE
YD 128673



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Enclosure (1)
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HEADQUARTERS
Battalion Landing Team 1/3
9th Marine Amphibious Brigade
FPO, San Francisco 96602

3/PED/ljm
5050
5 December 1967

From: Commanding Officer, Battalion Landing Team 1/3
To: Commander Task Group 79.4

Subj: Combat Operations After Action Report

Ref: (a) CTG 79.4 Frag Order of 21 November 1967 for Operation BALLISTIC ARCH
(b) CTG 79.4 OPLAN 120A-67

Encl: (1) Operation Overlay

1. Code Name. Operation BALLISTIC ARCH
2. Dates of Operation. 240700H November 1967 to 271200H November 1967.
3. Location. Cam Lo District, Quang Tri Province.
4. Task Organization.

BLT 1/3

H&SCo (-)(Rein)

- Det (-) HqBn, 3rd MarDiv
- Det Disbursing Section
- Det Postal Section
- Det Btry A, 1st Bn, 12th Mar (Ln Tm)
- Det Hq Btry, 1st Bn, 12th Mar (NGF Ln Tm)
- Det 26 Mar (Radio Relay)
- 1st Clearing Plat (Rein), Co B, 3rd Med Bn
- Det 15th Dental Co
- Det 3rd Serv Bn, Logistical Support Unit
- Det (-) Hq Co, 9th MAB, Military Police
- 81mm Mortar Platoon (-) (2 Sections)

LtCol GOODALE
Capt LARIMORE
Capt YELLIG

Lt JOHNSON
LTJG STARGER (USN)

Lt KANTER (USNMC)
Lt MCGINN (USNMC)
Lt KENNEY

Lt BERKHEISER

Co A (Rein)

- Co A
- FO Tm, Btry A, 1st Bn, 12th Mar
- Det 2nd Plat, Co B, 3rd SP Bn (HST)
- Det 2nd Plat, Co A, 3rd Engr Bn
- Det H&S Co
- Det Intel Sect
- Det Comm Plat
- Det Med Plat
- Det TACP

Capt HANCOCK

- 1st Sect, 81mm Mortar Plat
- Det (-) Hq Co, 9th MAB, Military Police

1stBn, 3dMar S & C No. 00473-67
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ENCLOSURE (2)
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BLT 1/3
OPLAN 120A-67
BALLISTIC ARCH

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Co B (Rein)

Co B
 FO Tm, Btry A, 1st Bn, 12th Mar
 Det 2d Plat, Co B, 3rd SP Bn (HST)
 Det 2d Plat, Co A, 3rd Engr Bn
 Det H&S Co
 Det Intel Sect
 Det Comm Plat
 Det Med Plat
 Det TACP
 2d Sect 81mm Mortar Plat
 Det Hq Co, 9th MAB, Military Police

Capt SCHEIB

Co C (Rein)

Co C
 FO Tm, Btry A, 1st Bn, 12th Mar
 Det 2d Plat, Co B, 3rd SP Bn (HST)
 Det 2d Plat, Co A, 3rd Engr Bn
 Det Intel Sect
 Det Comm Plat
 Det Med Plat
 Det TACP
 Det Hq Co, 9th MAB, Military Police

Capt OSGOOD

Btry A (-) (Rein), 1st Bn, 12th Mar

Btry A
 Det Hq Btry, 1st Bn, 12th Mar

Capt KENYON

4.2" Mortar Btry, 2d Bn, 12th Mar

Capt PATTERSON

4th Plat (Rein), Co A, 5th AmTrac Bn

Lt KAUFMAN

3d Plat (Rein), Co C, 3d Tank Bn

Det H&SCo, 3rd Tank Bn
 3d Plat, Co C, 3rd Tank Bn

Lt BUCKLEY

2d Plat (-) (Rein), Co B, 3d SP Bn

2d Plat, Co B, 3rd SP Bn
 Det H&SCo, 3rd SP Bn

Lt WYMER

2d Plat (-) (Rein), Co A, 3rd Engr Bn

2d Plat, Co A, 3rd Engr Bn
 Det H&SCo, 3rd Engr Bn
 Det Engr Supt Co, 3rd Engr Bn

Lt GARDNER

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1st Plat (Rein), Co A, 3rd AT Bn
 1st Plat, Co A, 3rd AT Bn
 Det H&SCo, 3rd AT Bn

SSgt ALLEN

1st Plat (Rein), Co B, 3rd MT Bn
 1st Plat, Co B, 3rd MT Bn
 Det H&SCo, 3rd MT Bn

Lt BYSTEDT

1st Plat (-), Co B, 3rd Recon Bn

Sgt GEERTS

BLT Reserve

Capt RICHARDSON

Co D (Rein)

Co D

FO Tm, Btry A, 1st Bn, 12th Mar
 Det 2d Plat, Co B, 3rd SF Bn (HST)
 Det 2d Plat, Co A, 3rd Engr Bn
 Det H&SCo

Det Intel Sect

Det Comm Plat

Det Med Plat

Det TACP

Det Hq Co, 9th MAB, Military Police

5. Supporting Forces. Due to lack of enemy contact, the requirements for strict adherence to rules of engagement, and the open friendliness of indigenous personnel in the AOA, little use was made of supporting forces available to the BLT for actual combat.

a. Artillery Summary.

- (1) Direct support artillery fires were provided by Btry A, 1st Bn, 12th Marines located at 345695.
- (2) General support artillery fires were available from the LVTH-6's of 1st Amtrac Bn, located at 348697 and from the 12th Marines.
- (3) Ammunition Expenditure

HE	105 rounds
WP	0 rounds
Flum	1 round
- (4) Missions fired

Observed	1	Illumination
Unobserved	34	Harrassment and Interdiction

- b. Naval Gunfire Summary. Four Naval Gunfire Ships were available for use by BLT1/3, however, no naval gunfire missions were required or utilized.

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- c. 81mm Mortars Summary. BLT 1/3 placed its organic 81mm Mortars in General support for the operation. Only one mission was fired and it consisted of two rounds of 81mm mortar illumination.
- d. Air Summary. During the operation, BLT 1/3 utilized twelve UH-1E sorties in a cover/fire suppression role. Twelve sorties were flown in support of the BLT by the CTG 79.4 staff aerial observer either in an unarmed UH-1E or an H-34. Four command and control missions were flown to enable the battalion commander to better evaluate the terrain and observe and control movement during the operation. All resupply was effected by H-34 and all routine medevac's were extracted by the resupply helicopters.
6. Intelligence. Prior to commencement of the operation, there were reports of VC and VC sympathizers north of Grid Line 72 and possible rocket caches located within the AOA. An Armed Propaganda Team with Co A obtained a list of names of VC and VC sympathizers in the Hamlet Mai Xa Thi on the night of 24 November 1967. At approximately 0845 on 25 November, elements of Co A discovered a fifteen year old boy whose name was on the list. The youth readily admitted to being a VC for the past two months. Local inhabitants reported that the VC had moved both north and west as Marine elements approached the villages in the area.
- Only one minor contact with the enemy was reported. On 25 November at 2125, an unknown number of VC fired small arms into a position occupied by a Co D ambush.
- There were no mining incidents or other harassing activities, as the enemy chose to avoid contact and apparently moved out of the area.
7. Mission. At L-Hour, on D-Day conduct a helicopter borne assault into LZ Robin (YD 297694), alternate LZ Cardinal (YD 303708). At H-Hour conduct an amphibious assault over Green Beach (center coordinates YD 324720). Conduct initial search and destroy operations against NVA/VC to southwest. Subsequent movements on order CTG 79.4. Designate reserve company to be committed on order CTG 79.4.
8. Concept of Operations.
- a. Commencing H-Hour, D-Day BLT 1/3 landed over Green Beach in LVT's and LCM's with two companies in column, seized and secured the beach and approaches thereto, and on order moved abreast in a coordinated search and destroy operation to the southwest attacking and seizing objectives 1 and 2.
- b. Commencing L-Hour, D-Day BLT 1/3 landed one company by helicopter in LZ Robin, seized and secured the LZ, and on order moved in a coordinated search and destroy operation to the southwest to attack and seize objective 3. One Company was assigned initially as SIF reserve

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aboard the LPH including a Sparrow-Hawk platoon size reaction force. This company was released to the control of BLT 1/3 and landed in LZ Robin, assuming the mission of BLT Reserve.

- d. Objectives 4, 5, and 6 were attacked and seized with two companies up and two back, followed by an amphibious withdrawal of all BLT 1/3 elements from White Beach (centered coordinates 339700).
- e. See operation overlay, Enclosure (1).

9. Execution

Sequence of Events

- 240700H Company B landed on Green Beach
- 240700H First elements of Company C landed in LZ Robin.
- 240705H Company A landed on Green Beach.
- 240745H Alfa Command arrived LZ Robin.
- 240810H Companies A and B were on Phase Line GOAT.
- 240825H First elements of Company D landed in LZ Robin.
- 240920H All units of BLT 1/3 on Phase Line RAT. BLT objective 1 secured by Company B.
- 241210H BLT Objective 2 secured by Company B.
- 241225H Companies A and C on BLT Objective 3.
- 241400H CTG 79.4 objective A secured by BLT 1/3.
- 241800H Frag. Order #2 given to all units of BLT 1/3.
- 241900H Unit Positions: Company A coordinates 286673, Company B coordinates 287677, Company C coordinates 286675, Company D coordinates 286674.
- 250850H Company A apprehended one VC who was posing as a buffalo tender at coordinates 287673. He was identified from a village blacklist carried by a member of the APT.
- 250945H BLT objective 4 secured by Company C.
- 251200H BLT objective 5 secured by Company C. BLT objective 6 secured by Company B. CTG 79.4 objective B secured by BLT 1/3.
- 251820H Frag Order #3 given to all units of BLT 1/3.
- 251900H Unit Positions: Company A coordinates 273705, Company B coordinates 282706, Company C coordinates 267705, Company D coordinates 284705.
- 252125H A Company D ambush received incoming small arms fire at coordinates 286706 and relocated their positions.
- 260730H BLT 1/3 commenced a deliberate search and destroy operation toward the Southwest.
- 261200H BLT 1/3 arrived at a location near the mouth of the north bank of the Cua Viet River.
- 261600H APT'S were detached from BLT 1/3.
- 261800H Frag order #4 given to all units of BLT 1/3.
- 261900H Unit Positions: Company A coordinates 333704, Company B coordinates 337707, Company C coordinates 333704, Company D coordinates 337704.
- 270705H Beach Jumper Units detached from BLT 1/3.
- 270715H BLT 1/3 commenced an amphibious withdrawal from White Beach coordinates 339700.
- 271145H BLT 1/3 completed the amphibious withdrawal from White Beach

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271200H Operation BALLISTIC ARCH was terminated for BLT 1/3. BLT 1/3 was chopped Op-Con to the 9th Marines.

10. Results.

- a. Friendly Losses. None
- b. Enemy Losses. One POW
- c. No equipment, ordnance, food, or supplies of any type, belonging to the enemy were found or captured.

11. Administrative Matters.

- a. POSTAL. Mail was delivered while BLT 1/3 was in a defensive posture with normal resupply .
- b. LOGISTICS. No logistics problems of any kind were encountered. All resupply was effected by helicopter, utilizing company landing zones. Medevacs were flown out on resupply helicopters. C-rations were provided for all meals but one, which consisted of sandwiches, fruit and coffee flown ashore from the ships of ARG Alpha.

12. Commander's Analysis.

- a. In the area of communications, six frequency changes were required due to mutual interference with each other, or with other stations operating in the immediate vicinity. One frequency was assigned to both BLT 1/3 and 1st Bn 11th Marines.
- b. Surf conditions for the landing of LVT's over Green Beach were marginal at H-Hour, and resulted in the LVT's taking on a considerable amount of sea water. At times the water inside the LVT's was knee deep. Also two Marines were swept from the top of the LVT's into the sea; fortunately they were rescued.
- c. Intelligence concerning the AOA appeared to be somewhat outdated, or inaccurate in regard to the current enemy situation. No fighting holes, bunkers or fortifications of any kind were uncovered during the operation. Further indications of enemy activity were negligible except for one incident on the night of 25 November when Delta Company's ambush received several rounds of incoming small arms fire. The area appeared to be quite pacified and the indigenous personnel were very friendly.

13. Recommendations.

- a. That a closer check be made by the frequency coordinator at Division level to prevent two units being assigned the same frequency, or frequencies close enough to cause mutual interference.

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- b. That better information on sea and surf conditions be obtained prior to landing elements by surface means over the beach. Surf conditions were considered hazardous for landing the LVTP-5's.
- c. That the intelligence collection effort in the AOA covered by BLT 1/3 be reevaluated.




H. W. GOODALE
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Commanding

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BALLISTIC ARCH
OPERATION OVERLAY
MAP SHEET 6442 IV
SCALE 1:50,000



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ENCLOSURE I

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