

HEADQUARTERS  
2nd Battalion, 7th Marines  
9th Marine Amphibious Brigade  
FPO San Francisco, California 96602

3/MWB/mar  
3000  
1 Nov 1968  
Ser. No. 0049-68

2 Bn. 7th Marines  
Log No. 00190-08

From: Commanding Officer  
To: Commander, Task Force 79.5

Copy No. 17 of 35

Subj: Command Chronology for period 1-31 Oct 1968

Ref: (a) MCO 5750.2  
(b) FMFPACO 5750.8  
(c) 9th Mar BrigO 5750.1C

Encl: ✓(1) Battalion Landing Team 2/7 Command Chronology

1. In accordance with the provisions of reference (a), (b), and (c) enclosure (1) is submitted.
2. This letter is downgraded to unclassified upon removal of enclosure (1).

*N. A. Nelson*  
N. A. NELSON

UNCLASSIFIED

2ND BN/7TH MAR  
CMD CHRON

OCT 1968

BATTALION LANDING TEAM 2/7

COMMAND CHRONOLOGY

1 - 31 Oct 1968

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

PART I ORGANIZATIONAL DATA

- A. Unit Designation
- B. Staff Officers
- C. Location
- D. Average Monthly Strength

PART II NARRATIVE SUMMARYPART III SEQUENTIAL LISTING OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

- A. Combat Mission Assigned
- B. Significant Operations Conducted
- C. Casualties Inflicted on the Enemy
- D. Casualties Sustained
- E. New Techniques Employed
- F. Command Relations
- G. Equipment
- H. Logistics
- I. Civic Action
- J. Administration
- K. Medical/Dental Affairs
- L. Intelligence
- M. Communications
- N. Weather
- O. Fire Support
- P. Air Support
- Q. Training

PART IV SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

- ✓ A. Combat After Action Report (Operation TALLEDEGA CANYON 1-5 Oct 1968)
- ✓ B. Combat After Action Report (Operation MAUI PEAK 6-17 Oct 1968)
- ✓ C. Overlay of BLT TAOR 18-27 Oct 1968
- ✓ D. Combat After Action Report (Operation SABINE DRAW 28 Oct-1 Nov 1968)
- ✓ E. Frag Order 87-68
- ✓ F. Frag Order 88-68
- ✓ G. Frag Order 89-68
- ✓ H. Frag Order 90-68
- ✓ I. Frag Order 86-68 ( enclosed in original copy of Command Chronology forwarded to CMC only)

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PART I

ORGANIZATIONAL DATADATE COVERED

1-31 Oct 1968

A. UNIT DESIGNATION

1. Battalion Landing Team 2/7  
Company E

Company F  
Company G  
Company H  
H&S Company (-) (Rein)

2nd Plat (Rein), Co B, 1st Tank Bn  
3rd Plat (Rein), Co A, 5th AT Bn  
2nd Plat (Rein), Co A, 1st MT Bn  
2nd Plat (Rein), Co C, 1st Engr Bn  
3rd Plat (Rein), Co B, 3rd Amtrac Bn  
1st Plat (Rein), Co E, 1st Recon Bn  
C&C Plat (Rein), Co A, 5th Med Bn  
Det, 1st SP Bn  
Det, Hq Bn, 7th Mar Div  
Det, Hq Co, 7th Mar

## 2. Attached Units

Battery H, 3rd Bn, 11th Mar  
107mm Mortar Battery, 3rd Bn, 11th Mar

LtCol. N. A. NELSON  
Capt. J. T. FRICKER  
1-18 Oct 1968  
Capt. A. R. NELSON  
19-31 Oct 1968  
Capt. R. R. WELPOTT  
Capt. A. V. LATTORRE JR.  
Capt. T. P. E. HOLM  
Lt. J. H. HALSEY II  
1-18 Oct 1968  
Capt. J. T. FRICKER  
19-31 Oct 1968  
Lt. M. E. HASTINGS  
Lt. T. D. O'CONNOR  
Lt. E. T. CHARBONNEAU  
Lt. D. G. PATTERSON  
Lt. M. E. NELSON  
Lt. W. H. MCCLOSKEY  
Lt. (MC) D. N. SMITH USN  
Lt. I. J. STEVENS  
CWO2 W. PICKARSKI  
Sgt. J. L. MC DANIELS

Capt. J. J. JAMES  
Capt. J. P. RIORDAN

B. STAFF OFFICERS

XO

S-1  
S-2  
S-3  
S-4  
Personnel Officer  
Embarkation Officer  
Communication Officer  
Artillery Liaison Officer  
Naval Gun Fire Officer  
Air Liaison Officer  
Forward Air Controller

Maj. L. J. DES JARDINES  
1-23 Oct. 1968  
Maj. H. S. LONERGAN  
24-31 Oct. 1968  
Lt. J. M. CARTER  
Lt. J. R. PIPPEN  
Maj. E. M. DUNN  
Lt. T. LUKAWECZ  
Lt. R. HARRELLE  
Lt. E. E. DELGADO  
Lt. T. T. DABNEY  
Lt. W. S. SHEAHAN III  
Lt. (jg) M. J. CULLEN USN  
Capt. J. J. QUAID  
Lt. D. S. HOOVER

ENCLOSURE (1)

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Supply Officer  
 Motor Transport Officer  
 Chaplain  
 Medical Officer

Lt. W. L. SMITH III  
 Lt. L. A. RAYMOND  
 Lt. (CHC) B. LOVEJOY, USN  
 Lt. J. D. REED, USN

C. LOCATION1. BLT 2/7

- a. 1-5 Oct 1968: Operation TALLEDEGA CANYON, QUANG NAM PROVINCE, RVN
- b. 6-17 Oct 1968: Operation MAUI PEAK, QUANG NAM PROVINCE, RVN
- c. 18-27 Oct 1968: Hill 55, QUANG NAM PROVINCE, RVN
- d. 28-31 Oct 1968: Operation SABINE DRAW, QUANG NAM PROVINCE, RVN

2. Detachments

None

3. Attachments

- a. Co D, 1st Battalion 5th Marines: 011430-151505 Oct 1968

D. AVERAGE MONTHLY STRENGTH

<u>USMC</u>		<u>USN</u>	
<u>Officers</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>
57	1590	4	80

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## PART II

NARRATIVE SUMMARY

During the period 1-5 October 1968 BLT 2/7 participated in Operation (TALLEDEGA CANYON) in the Happy Valley-Sherwood Forest area (Part IV, TAB A). During the period 6-17 October 1968 BLT 2/7 participated in Operation (MAUI PEAK) in the vicinity of the THUONG DUC CIDG Camp (PART IV, TAB B). In these operations the BLT proved its flexibility, having commenced Operation MAUI PEAK only 15 hours after concluding Operation (TALLEDEGA CANYON). During the period 1-17 October 1968 the BLT rear was located at DAI LA PASS (AT939748). While at DAI LA PASS the BLT assumed OPCON of Co D, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines from 1-15 October 1968. On 4 October 1968 ARG shipping disembarked all units and supplies necessary to the support of the BLT with the exception of 3rd Platoon, Co B, 3rd Amtrac Bn, and departed for rehabilitation at Subic Bay, Republic of the Philippines. ARG shipping returned on 19 October and immediately departed again for the Taiwan Area. During this time the BLT operated ashore under OPCON of 7th Marine Regiment. 2nd Platoon, Co B, 1st Tank Battalion, and 3rd Platoon, Co A, 5th Anti-tank Battalion were established at 1st Tank Battalion (AT994723) from 2 October through 31 October 1968.

During the period 1-17 October security elements of the BLT rear located at DAI LA PASS (AT939748) received one enemy incoming grenade but suffered no casualties. At 2030 on 10 October an ambush from Co D, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines received three incoming grenades, and small arms fire at the ambush site (AT925751) from an unknown number of VC resulting in one WIA. The ambush returned fire with grenades, LAWS, and small arms. An 81mm mortar mission was called in on the enemy position. The ambush site was searched at first light and bandages and blood trails were found. At 2245 on 10 October Co D, 1st Bn, 5th Marines defensive position (AT932754) received three incoming grenades resulting in three WIA.

At 2030 on 11 October the security units from the BLT Rear in a defensive position (AT938747) received three B-40 rockets, and small arms fire from enemy positions in vicinity of AT930746. Small Arms fire was returned; there were no casualties. At 2130 defensive positions (AT929755) received two grenades resulting in three WIAs. Small arms fire was returned with unknown results. At 0530 on 14 October a defensive position of the BLT Rear (AT939746) received three to five rounds small arms fire from an enemy position in vicinity of AT937730. Small arms fire was returned with negative results. Co D, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines found a complete B-40 rocket in vicinity AT936744 at 1015 on 14 October.

On 17 October the BLT Rear was moved from DAI LA PASS to Hill 55 (AT967617). When the BLT returned from Operation (MAUI PEAK) it was assigned a TAOR around Hill 55 (Part IV, TAB C). On 29 October 1968 ARG shipping returned on station off the coast of Vietnam to provide support for the BLT. While the BLT was participating in Operation (SABINE DRAW) the provisional platoon from Headquarters Co, 7th Marines and two platoons from Co L, 3rd Bn, 7th Marines assumed the activities within the northern two sections of the BLT TAOR, including the roadsweeps to the north of Hill 55 and the security of Golden Gate Bridge.

On 18 October 1968 the BLT commenced Operations in the assigned TAOR with Co "G" providing daily security for units of 2nd Platoon, Co C, 1st Engineer Battalion who swept the roads to the north and south of Hill 55. Company "H" established a company (-) size security force on Golden Gate Bridge. Companies "E" "F" and "G" patrolled around Hill 55, providing security for the 7th Marines Regimental Combat Base. Patrols were conducted throughout the TAOR with units from squad to Company (-) size. (See TABS E thru H)

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At 1235 on 21 October Company "G" captured two detainees which were taken from a village (AT940608) after five Vietnamese attempted to evade the patrol.

At 0947 on 22 October 1968 Company "F" discovered and destroyed 600 lbs of rice, one ChiCom booby trap, and assorted medical supplies in an open field (AT948609). Company "H" found 200 lbs of rice, 17 M-14 rounds, a jar of light gun oil, one E-tool and a machine gun wrench. At 1030 on 22 October while conducting a sweep in vicinity of (AT940605) Company "F" found a cache of NVA equipment including one pack, two shirts, one pair of trousers, one towel and a hammock, while sweeping in vicinity of AT941607. at 1200 on 22 October 1968.

At 1700 on 22 October Company "F" found three booby traps in vicinity of AT950607, 949608, 939612 made from C-ration cans filled with C-4. The AP devices were destroyed in place.

Company "E" found a "pineapple-type" grenade lying on the trail (AT949609) which was destroyed in place at 0845 on 23 October 1968.

Company "F" found a house with a false floor (AT942614) containing 1200 lbs of rice and 500 lbs of corn, while on patrol. At 0953 on 23 October the grain was carried back to Hill 55; and the floor was destroyed.

At 1055 Company "F" found one ton of rice in large jars in vicinity of AT937613. The rice was returned to Hill 55. At 1250 on 23 October Battery H, 3rd Battalion, 11th Marines called artillery mission on a squad of VC carrying sandbags into a village (AT98305988) killing one of the VC. At 1530 on 23 October four Marines from Company "H" were wounded when a pressure-type mine was detonated in vicinity of AT 948590. an emergency medevac was called. The medevac of all wounded was completed at 1710. Company "E" found seven 55 gallon drums of gasoline when squad patrol searched through a ville (AT933633). The gasoline was turned in to the S-2.

At 0645 on 24 October Company "E" sent a platoon size patrol to vicinity of AT 4684) capturing three VC suspects.

At 1125 on 24 October an S-2 Patrol captured a VC suspect in the process of burying 300 lbs of rice in vicinity of AT975585. the rice was destroyed and the VC was turned into S-2 for interrogation.

At 1650 on 24 October a squad size patrol from Company "H" in vicinity AT975603 received fire from an unknown size enemy force who fired from the vicinity of (AT975605) wounding one Marine.

Company "E" found two command detonated satchel charges 101 pounds a piece at 1000 on 26 October while providing security for a roadsweep in vicinity AT969604, the satchel charges were blown in place.

At 1100 on 26 October Company "H" received 300-500 rounds of small arms fire from an estimated enemy squad in vicinity (AT947601). Company "H" returned fire and swept through the area apprehending three VCS, one Marine was wounded.

On 27 October the BLT made preparation for the operation coming up. At 1025 a squad size patrol from Company "G" found one VN male without ID card and 2400lbs of rice, which was turned in to Bn S-2.

During the period 28-31 October 1968 BLT 2/7 participated in Operation (SABINE DRAW) in the assigned TAOR area (Part IV, TAB D).

ENCLOSURE (1)

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## PART III

SEQUENTIAL LISTINGS OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTSA. COMBAT MISSIONS ASSIGNED

1. During the period from 1-5 October 1968, BLT 2/7 took part in Operation TALLEDEGA CANYON, in the Sherwood Forest area to the southeast of Danang. Its mission was to conduct a deliberate sweep and search of the Sherwood Forest and Worth Ridge area to capture or destroy all enemy forces, materials, fortifications, and caches.
2. During the period from 6-17 October, BLT 2/7 took part in Operation MAUI PEAK in the Quang Nam Province, South Southeast of Danang. Its mission was to land, secure landing zone Vulture, and proceed along the ridge line from west to east to find, fix and destroy the enemy, his weapons and caches, thus relieving pressure on the Thoung Duc CIDG Camp, then under mortar, rocket, and ground attack.
3. During the period from 18-27 October the BLT was assigned the mission: To provide security for Golden Gate Bridge, conduct aggressive offensive operations and patrols throughout the Tactical Area of Responsibility, to destroy the enemy, deny him access to the area. On 23 October a three Company sweep was conducted around Hill 55 to reopen terrain made previously untenable by tropical storms.
4. During the period from 28 Oct - 1 Nov 1968 BLT 2/7 took part in Operation SABINE DRAW, east of Golden Gate Bridge and south of Son La Tho River. Its mission was to conduct detailed search and clear operations within AO to capture or destroy enemy forces, materials, fortifications, and caches.

B. SIGNIFICANT OPERATIONS CONDUCTED

1. Operation TALLEDEGA CANYON, Quang Nam Province, RVN, 01000H-050930H.
2. Operation MAUI PEAK, Quang Nam Province, RVN, 060600H-171800H.
3. Operation SABINE DRAW, Quang Nam Province, RVN, 280001H

C. CASUALTIES INFLICTED ON THE ENEMY AND WEAPONS CAPTURED1. PERSONNEL

a. NVA KIA	5
b. VC KIA	10
c. Detainees	78

2. WEAPONS CAPTURED

a. AK-47	5
b. SKS	2

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3. GRENADES AND MINES CAPTURED

- a. ChiCom grenades 103  
 b. M-26 Fuze 1

4. ASSORTED AMMUNITION BY ROUNDS

- a. AK-47 rounds 1,495  
 b. SKS rounds 50  
 c. B-40 rocket rounds 1  
 d. 3.5 round did 1  
 e. Light MG ammunition unk type 300  
 f. RPG 7 Rockets 4  
 g. 7.62 (short rounds) 30  
 h. B-40 Rocket round 19

5. MISCELLANEOUS GEAR CAPTURED (In large quantities if not specified)

- a. Rice 10,775 lbs  
 b. Corn 1,855 lbs  
 c. Beans 100 lbs  
 d. Gas 385 gal  
 e. Assorted Medical Gear  
 f. Miscellaneous Individual Combat Gear  
 g. Assorted Tools  
 h. Assorted Cooking Utensils  
 i. Weapons Cleaning Gear  
 j. Assorted Clothing  
 k. Sewing Machine 1  
 l. Salt 2 lbs  
 m. B-40 Rocket booster 19  
 n. Communication Wire 4 Rolls  
 o. TNT 10 lbs, C-4 8 lbs, Blasting Caps 10, Shape charges 2-25 lbs

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D. CASUALTIES SUSTAINED

1. <u>USMC</u>	<u>Officers</u>	KIA	0	<u>Enlisted</u>	KIA	0
		WIAE	0		WIAE	38
		WIANE	1		WIANE	18
		NBCE	0		NBCE	90
					DIA	2
				DOW	2	
2. <u>USN</u>	<u>Officers</u>	none		<u>Enlisted</u>	WIANE	1
					NBCE	4
					DOC	1

E. NEW TECHNIQUES

None

F. COMMAND RELATIONS

- a. 011430H Assumed OPCON Co "D" 1st Battalion, 5th Marines
- b. 020800H Chop 1st Plat, Co "C", 1st Tank Bn and 3rd Plat, Co "C" 1st AT Bn to 1st Tank Battalion
- c. 151505H Chop Co "D" to 1st Battalion, 5th Marines
- d. 221400H Chop Hotel and Mortar Battery to 3rd Battalion, 11th Marines

G. EQUIPMENT

- a. 1st and 2nd echelon maintenance was performed on all organic vehicles.
  1. Weekly Preventive Maintenance
  2. Quarterly Preventive Maintenance
- b. The following items were turned in for repair's at FSR Danang, RVN.
  1. M-35 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ T Truck Engine
  2. M-35 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ T Truck Engine
  3. M-151A1 Mine Damage
  4. M-151A1 Wrecked
  5. M-170  $\frac{1}{4}$ T Ambulance Engine

H. LOGISTICS

- a. General Logistics was provided by organic supporting units while the BLT was employed in its assigned Combat Base at DAI LA PASS.
  1. Continued to improve defensive positions by supplying sand bags, concertina wire, engineer stakes and lumber upon request.
  2. Provided defoliation materials to clear vegetation around TAOR.
  3. Assigned engineer work requirements to attached engineer platoon to improve living environments, and working spaces.
- b. For the period 5 October thru 18 October 1968 the Battalion was committed to Operation MAUL PEAK. With Logistics Support being provided by the ISA at 7th Marine's Regimental Headquarters, Hill 55, with the following classes of supplies sent out to the operating units.

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CLASS I	MCI	1771 Cases
	Water	15,460 Gal
	SP Packs	49 Pkg
	Trioxane	7,105 Tabs
	Long Range Rats	300 Cases
CLASS II	Poncho	56
	Towels	630
	Trousers	244
	T-Shirts	916
	Socks	537
	Packboards	22
	BA 386	28 Cases
	BA 30	5 Cases
	Canteens	6
	Canteen Cups	5
	Canteen Covers	3
	Rubber Lady's	72
	Poncho Liners	188
	Flashlights	20
	Boots	13
	Jackets	58
	Flack Jackets	1
	Insect Repellant	10 Cases
	LSA Oil	3 Cases
	Wire MX 306	1 Roll
	Foot Powder	3 Boxes
	Salt Tabs	23 Bottles
CLASS III	Mogas	20 Gal
	Oil	5 Gal
CLASS IV	Sandbags	2,200 Bags
CLASS V	81mm HE	40 Rds
	81mm WP	30 Rds
	81mm Illumination	30 Rds
	60mm HE	289 Rds
	60mm WP	65 Rds
	60mm Illumination	20 Rds
	40mm HE	127 Rds
	106 RR HEAT	66 Rds
	7.62 Linked	7 Cases
	5.56 Ball	27 Cases
	G890	6 Cases
	.45	1 Box
	3.5 HE	9 Rds
	3.5 WP	2 Rds
	M-26 Fragmentation	131 Grenades
	LAAWS	2 Cases
	Claymores	6
	Parachute Flares	3 Cases
	Riot Grenades	2
	CS Grenades	2

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00 Buckshot	30 Rds
Hand Illumination	24 Grenades
G940	16
G945	16
Time Fuze	500 Ft
Det Cord	1,000 Ft
C-4	906 Lbs
Elasting Caps	100

On 15 October 1968 the Battalion Rear commenced movement to Hill 55, 7th Marine Regimental Headquarters. This move was drastically slowed down by inclement weather.

On 18 October the Battalion returned from Operation (MAUI PEAK) with the following type items being available for their use at Hill 55:

- (1) Limited Clothing
- (2) Ordnance contact teams to repair all weapons
- (3) Transportation available for all Companies
- (4) PX facilities
- (5) Shower Units
- (6) Tentage
- (7) Head facilities

- c. During the period of 19 thru 31 October 1968 the Battalion was logistically supported by organic support units. On 28 October 1968 the Battalion was committed to operation 'SABINE DRAW' with the LSA being established at Hill 55, 7th Marine Regimental Headquarters.

## 2. TRANSPORTATION

- a. Transportation for the BLT was provided by organic vehicles and assigned helicopter supporting units.
- b. 1st and 2nd echelon maintenance was performed on all organic vehicles.

## 3. EMBARKATION

- a. During the period covered by this report the following items have off loaded from assigned ARG shipping.

- (1) 5 Tanks
- (2) 5 Ontos
- (3) 2 Amtracs
- (4) 1 B-43B1 Ambulance

- b. Back loaded the following:

- (1) 3 Amtracs
- (2) Administrative Sections

- c. Continued to improve the Mechanized Embarkation Data System to keep the readiness status of this Battalion at its maximum.

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I. CIVIC ACTION

NO significant Civic Action was taken by the BLT during this reporting period; no Civic Action projects were initiated or completed. The BLT was under OPCON to 7th Marines, 1st Marine Division during the month of October and was moved from one AO to another and was unable to be established in an area long enough to establish a program of Civic Action.

J. ADMINISTRATION1. Awards

Bronze Stars	4
Navy and Marine Corps Medal	1
Navy Commendation Medal	1
Purple Hearts	29

2. Recommended for Awards

Medal of Honor	1
Navy Cross	2
Silver Star	12
Bronze Star	6
Navy Commendation Medal	2

2. Legal and Discipline

a. NJP's	33		
b. Courts	3	Specials	2 Summary's

3. Postal

All package mail was held in the rear and distributed upon the return of the Battalion from operations during the month of October. Mail for troops aboard ship was delivered to Subic Bay.

4. R&R continued as normal. The battalion received and filled 113 R&R Quotas during the Month.

5. Promotions

	<u>Regular</u>	<u>Meritorious</u>
1st Lt.	3	
SSgt.	1	
Sgt	3	
Cpl	27	1
L/Cpl	87	2
Pfc	5	2

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6. Pay and Allowances

Pay Call was held once during the month of October for the entire Command.

7. Postal Exchange

BLT 2/7 personnel had access to the Hill 55 Exchange on a Daily basis. While in the field, health and comfort items were available from Sundry Packs distributed.

8. Personnel Changea. Battle Losses

	<u>USMC</u>		<u>USN</u>	
	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>
	0	4	0	1
Admin. (Transfers, Rotation, MEDEVACS)	3	107	1	10
b. Replacements	9	212	2	10

9. Religious Servicesa. Divine Services

<u>Date</u>	<u>Type Service</u>	<u>Place</u>	<u>Attendance</u>
6 Oct	Holy Communion	7th Regimental CP Hill 55	76
13 Oct	Tactical Situation precluded Services		
20 Oct	Holy Communion	7th Regimental CP Hill 55	35
24 Oct	Memorial Services	"E" & "F" Company Area	240
27 Oct	Holy Communion	"G" & "H" Company Area	28
27 Oct	Holy Communion	"E" & "F" Company Area	37
27 Oct	Memorial Service	"G" Company Area	132
27 Oct	Memorial Service	"H" Btry & H&S Co	240
27 Oct	Holy Communion	"H&S" Company Area	57

Copies of the Bulletin for the Memorial Service and a letter describing the event were mailed to the next of kin of those in whose Memory the services were held.

b. Counseling

The Battalion Chaplain was in the field with the BLT for the month covered by the report. The number of personnel counseling sessions always difficult to be determined, is estimated at 18. Informal contact and casual conversation with the men of the BLT continued at a steady pace.

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c. Visitations

Approximately 35 patients were visited on three occasions in the NSA Hospital and the 1st Hospital Company facility.

One visit was made to the III MAF Brig to visit three Marines the BLT confined there. On these visits the Battalion Sergeant Major and Chaplain called together.

- d. Nineteen Health and Welfare report messages requesting information concerning Marine's families were prepared. Four emergency messages were delivered by the chaplain.

K. MEDICAL AND DENTAL AFFAIRS1. Medical

The BAS was at DAI LA PASS from 10 October to 16 October and at Hill 55 from 17 - 31 October 1968. During the month 1,423 patients were seen, of which nine were combat casualties. There were a large number of skin infections affecting a significant percentage of the Marines after Operation MAUI PEAK. There were quite a few cases of mild Immersion foot. Twenty-one patients were medevaced to the USS TRIPOLI for further treatment on 20 Oct 1968. These Marines had the more severe infections after Operation MAUI PEAK.

There were no cases of Scrub Typhus reported during the month of October.

2. Dental

Dental facilities in general have never been readily available to the BLT from 3 July to 31 October. However the BLT was always in the field at this time and patients were medevaced to the USS TRIPOLI for dental work only if there was a severe dental problem.

The dental problems seen at DAI LA PASS and Hill 55 were sent to 1st Dental, Danang and 7th Regimental Dentist.

3. Sanitation

No unusual problems encountered at DAI LA PASS nor at Hill 55 during the month of October.

L. INTELLIGENCE

1. For Operational period 1-5 October 1968 see Part IV TAB A.
2. For Operational period 6-17 October 1968 see Part IV TAB B.
3. Prior to being committed to Operation SABINE DRAW activities in BLT 2/7's TAOR were very light indicating that the enemy would continue to be evasive. There were numerous booby trap incidents and booby traps found indicating the enemy would continue his harassing tactics against friendlies in the area. Identification or determination of the enemy's composition could not be made. During the <sup>period</sup> 18-27 October approximately 25 detainees were apprehended by small units patrolling the TAOR. Of the 25, five were later confirmed to be active

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- VC by the 9th ITT. All five were ardent VC with no desire to rally.
4. For Operational period 28-31 October 1968 see Part IV TAB D.

#### M. COMMUNICATIONS

Communications during this reporting period was good. All Tactical traffic was passed over FM nets utilizing the PRC-25 in the maneuver elements and a PRC-25, RT-524 installation in the Battalion Rear.

On Operation MAUI PEAK it was found that the relatively large distance between the Battalion and the 7th Regimental CP combined with intervening hill masses made direct communications impossible. Communications was maintained by relaying through either 3/5 or 3/7.

The new directional RC-2236 antenna was used in the Battalion Rear and gave good results, especially in the longer distance shots. This effect was especially noted on the SIF Tac Net where the straight line distance between stations at night was as much as 30 - 35 miles.

The Battalion maneuver elements used both tape and whip antennas. Cipher capability was maintained using a RT-524 KY-8 combination.

The Communication Platoon technicians provided a continuous rehabilitation program for malfunctioning radios and accessories and were able to make a one-for-one turn around for any radio which they were not able to fix.

In effect, the rifle companies, and attached units always had available their full complement of communication gear.

#### N. WEATHER

Weather showed an increase in precipitation for the reporting period thus hampering troop movement. There was a total of 39" of rainfall for the month of October 1968.

#### O. FIRE SUPPORT

1. For the period 1-5 October 1968 see Part IV TAB A, After Action Report for Operation (TALEDEGA CANYON).
2. For the period 6-17 October 1968 see Part IV TAB B, After Action Report for Operation (MAUI PEAK).
3. For the period 18-27 October 1968 fire support was adequate and responsive to the needs of the BLT. The BLT was supported by its organic 81mm Mortar Platoon and its attached Batteries, Hotel Battery 3rd Bn, 11th Marines. Fire support was accomplished through 8 registration missions, four destruction missions, 36 observed missions, and 32 unobserved missions. This resulted in an ammunition expenditure of 5,284 rounds HE, 94 rounds Illumination, and 80 WP rounds, for a grand total of 5,458 rounds expended. R&Is were fired on suspected enemy troop concentrations and routes of advance throughout the BLT TAOR. (See TAB C).
4. For the period 28- October 1968 see TAB D, After Action Report for Operation (SABINE DRAW).

ENCLOSURE (1)



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AIR SUPPORT

1. From the period 1-5 October 1968 when the BLT was on Operation (TALLEDEGA CANYON, See Part IV TAB A.
2. From the period 6-17 October 1968 when the BLT was on Operation (MAUI PEAK, See Part IV TAB B.
3. TACP functions for the period 18-27 October 1968 were conducted by the Command Group Operating from Hill 55 (AT970620) and were routine consisting of MED- EVACS and Administrative Helicopter flights, from HMM 165 stationed aboard the USS TRIPOLI (LPH 10). Two flights of fixed wing were requested and controlled by air observers at 1130 on 25 October to suppress enemy sniper fire at (AT975595). The fixed wing aircraft dropped soft ordnance consisting of Napalm canisters and 250 lb bombs.
4. From the period 28 October 1968 when the BLT was on Operation (SABINE DRAW) See Part IV TAB D.

Q. TRAINING

Due to Operational commitments of BLT 2/7 throughout the month of October, formal training conducted was at a minimum.

a. General Military Subjects	Hours
Field Firing	2
Care and Cleaning of TO Weapons	3
Radio Procedures	<u>1</u>
TOTAL	6


- b. RVN Orientation Indoctrination training was provided for 9 Marine Officers, 212 Marine Enlisted, 2 Naval Officers and 10 Naval Enlisted replacements during the reporting period.

ENCLOSURE (1)

PART IV SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

- ✓ TAB A - Combat After Action Report Operation (TALLEDEGA CANYON)
- ✓ TAB B - Combat After Action Report Operation (MAUI PEAK)
- ✓ TAB C - TAOR Overlay
- ✓ TAB D - Combat After Action Report Operation (SABINE DRAW)
- ✓ TAB E - Frag Order 87-68
- ✓ TAB F - Frag Order 88-68
- ✓ TAB G - Frag Order 89-68
- ✓ TAB H - Frag Order 90-68
- TAB I - Frag Order 86-68 ( enclosed in original copy of Command Chronology forwarded to CMC only)

  
N. A. NELSON

  
ENCLOSURE (1)

HEADQUARTERS  
 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines  
 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade  
 FPO San Francisco, California 96602

3/MWB/hb  
 3000  
 7 Oct 1968  
 Ser. No. 00190-68

2 Bn. 7th Marines  
 Log No. 00190-68  
 Copy No. 72 of 90

From: Commanding Officer  
 To: Commander Task Group 79.5  
 Commanding Officer, 7th Marines  
 Subj: Combat After Action Report (Operation TALLEDEGA CANYON).  
 Ref: (a) CTG 79.5 Operation Plan 120A-67  
 (b) Map AMS Vietnam 1:50,000 series L7014 Sheet 6640 IV  
 Encl: (1) Operation overlay for TALLEDEGA CANYON  
 (2) Schematic of Defenses on Hill 502

1. Operation TALLEDEGA CANYON
2. Dates and Locations

Operation TALLEDEGA CANYON began on 30 September 1968 and terminated on 05 October 1968. Operation TALLEDEGA CANYON was executed under OPCON of 7th Marines took place in the Happy Valley-Sherwood Forest west of DANANG.

3. Command Headquarters 300900H September to 050700H October 1968 Seventh Marines Regiment Combat Base Hill 55 (AT967616).
4. Task Organization

BLT 2/7

LtCol. N. A. NELSON

H&S Co (-) (Rein)

1stLt. J. H. HALSEY II

Det, HqBn 1st Mar Div  
 Det HqCo 7th Marines  
 Det Btry H (Rein) 3rd Bn, 11th Mar  
 Det Comm Plat, HqCo, 7th Mar  
 2nd Plat (Rein), Co C, 1st Engr Bn  
 Det, LSU For Log Cnd  
 Det Co C, 1st SP Bn  
 2nd Plat, Co A, 1st MT Bn

Tab A

Co E (Rein)

Capt. J. T. FRICKER

Co E  
 Det H&S Co  
 FAC Tm  
 FO Tm, 81MM Mortar Plat  
 NGF Spot Tm  
 Det Btry H (Rein) 3rd Bn, 11th Mar  
 Tm, 2nd Plat (Rein) Co C, 1st Engr Bn  
 HST Tm, Det, Co C, 1st SP Bn

Co F (Rein)

Capt. R. R. WELPOTT

Co F  
 Det H&S Co  
 FAC Tm  
 FO Tm, 81MM Mortar Plat  
 NGF Spot Tm  
 Det Btry H (Rein) 3rd Bn, 11th Mar  
 Tm, 2nd Plat (Rein) Co C, 1st Engr Bn  
 HST Tm, Det, Co C, 1st SP Bn

Co G (Rein)

Capt. J. R. LATORRE

Co G  
 Det H&S Co  
 FAC Tm  
 FO Tm, 81MM Mortar Plat  
 NGF Spot Tm  
 Det Btry H (Rein) 3rd Bn, 11th Mar  
 Tm, 2nd Plat (Rein) Co C, 1st Engr Bn  
 HST Tm, Det, Co C, 1st SP Bn

Co H (Rein)

Capt. T. P. E. HOLM

Co H  
 Det H&S Co  
 FAC Tm  
 FO Tm, 81MM Mortar Plat  
 NGF Spot Tm  
 Det Btry H (Rein) 3rd Bn, 11th Mar  
 Tm, 2nd Plat (Rein) Co C, 1st Engr Bn  
 HST Tm, Det, Co C, 1st SpBn

Btry H (Rein) 3rd Bn, 11th Mar

Capt. J. J. JAMES

Mortar Btry (Rein) 3rd Bn, 11th Mar  
81MM Mortar Plat  
2nd Plat, Co B, 1st Tank Bn  
3rd Plat, Co B, 3rd Antrac Bn  
1st Plat, Co B, 1st Recon Bn  
2nd Plat, Co A, 11th MT Bn

Capt. J. P. RIORDAN  
 1stLt. D. J. MCMAHON  
 1stLt. M. E. HASTINGS  
 2ndLt. M. E. NELSON  
 1stLt. W. H. MCCLOSKEY  
 1stLt. E. T. CHARBONEAU

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5. Intelligencea. Enemy Strength Prior to Operation

Elements of the 368B Artillery Regiment and the 31st Regiment, also the 88th and 4th Companies, and one unidentified Sapper Company and a Reconnaissance unit were reported to be operating in the TALLEDEGA CANYON AOA. The area of operation was a known infiltration route and it was believed it might contain harbor and/or storage and rocket sites.

b. Enemy Strength, Mission and Tactics during the Operation

Documents captured by Golf 2/7 indicated one company of the 2nd Bn, 31st NVA Regiment was located in the vicinity of Hill 502 (AT832659) where 2/7 initially started Operation TALLEDEGA CANYON. As the BLT moved through area indications were found, miscellaneous 782 gear, etc., that the enemy was indeed present in the area. Enemy avoided major contacts but employed mortars and snipers to his advantage as the operation progressed.

c. Terrain

Canopy was varied with dense undergrowth. On prominent terrain features, the canopy and most of the undergrowth had been destroyed by air and artillery bombardment.

d. Weather

Throughout most of the operation the weather was clear with occasional overcast and some scattered showers.

6. Mission

Commencing at 0600 hours on 30 September with coordination and cooperation BLT 2/7, the 21st and 37th Ranger Battalions moves into the area of operation by ground and by helicopter lifts, to conduct a deliberate search and sweep of Happy Valley - Sherwood Forest area to capture or destroy enemy forces, materials fortifications and caches.

7. Executiona. Summary

Operation TALLEDEGA CANYON commenced on 30 September with the insertion of the lead elements of the assault company, Company E at 0900 onto Hill 502 (LZ EAGLE) after light artillery preparatory fires. The first helicopter landed with fifteen men aboard, immediately received fire from enemy entrenched around the hill. The helicopter lifted off with the assault unit aboard and the operation was delayed for 24 hours.

Prior to the next assault three overlapping B52 strikes were delivered on Hill 502 and surrounding area. The effect of these strikes was excellent causing the destruction of most of the tunnel network in the hill itself. The landing on 1 September was uneventful. The BLT moved smoothly into LZ EAGLE, moving elements to the east and west of Hill 502 as the

LZ filled.

The 21st ARVN Ranger Battalion did not move by helicopter, as originally planned, but linked up with the 37th Ranger Battalion and conducted a hurried "sweep" of Happy Valley, each battalion in column, the battalions about 500 meters apart. These units moved down the clear part making no attempt to search the treelines or heavily vegetated areas. The planned blocking force and sweep of the valley, simultaneous with BLT 2/7 sweep of the high ground did not take place. By the end of the third day of the operation the ARVN Rangers had completed their evolution and were preparing to depart for home.

By early afternoon 2 October, Objective A was seized by Company E after the only fighting engagement of the operation. The defenders were a squad size unit that was easily overcome by a ground assault stiffened by supporting fires. Objective B was taken by Company "H" before dusk on 2 October. On the following day intermediate objectives and Objective C were seized and on 4 October sweeps along the ridge line and the valley floor to north and south of the ridge leading to Objective D were conducted. Objective D was seized by Company G at 1732. Significant finds and events resulting from the seizure of objectives and sweep and search of fingers and the lowlands to north and south of the axis of advance are enumerated below.

By dusk on 4 October the BLT had moved to and occupied defensive positions around Objective D and prepared, as directed, Landing Zones for withdrawal of the BLT at first light on 5 October.

#### b. Significant Events

- (1) On 01 October 1968, during the day an intensive search of the Landing Zone Eagle (AT832659) and immediate area, resulted in the uncovering of numerous reinforced bunkers, trenches, tunnels and foxholes. Blood stains in the bunkers indicated the Arc Light mission was highly effective prior to the landing of the BLT.
- (2) 011345H Engineers attached to the BLT command group detonated a COFRAM round while moving it to be destroyed resulting in 7 WIA and 3 WIAE.
- (3) Company G while searching LZ EAGLE in a south, southwesterly direction, found numerous reinforced bunkers containing one SKS rifle, four AK-47 rifles w/two magazines, 19 ChiCom grenades, 560 AK-47 rounds and one entrenching tool, all this equipment was uncovered in a three hours time, 011045H to 011345H.
- (4) Company F while on sweep at 011306H at (AT830660) found six reinforced bunkers, 15 medium fighting bunkers, nine fighting holes, and 100 meters of trenchline. Also uncovering one pack, one hand flare, one blasting cap, six water cans and one AK-47 magazine. At 011445H in the vicinity of (AT831660) Co F located 55 AK-47 rounds and one magazine pouch.
- (5) Company E moving to seize Objective A (AT856663) at 021110H received 300-400 rounds of small arms fire from an estimated squad of enemy, resulting in four friendly WIA's. Seizing Objective A a search of the area uncovered, 100 AK-47 rounds, one ChiCom grenade with one magazine pouch, 10 lbs of rice, two M-79 rounds, one NVA helmet and one en-

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trenching tool and one bloody bandage.

- (6) 030210 Co F defensive perimeter received two unknown type mortar rounds at coordinates (AT851663) resulting in three friendly WIA's.
- (7) 030220 BLT 2/7 Command Group defensive position located in vicinity (AT 855663) received one incoming grenade resulting in one friendly WIA. Searched area with negative results.
- (8) Company H while on sweep on 030915H at (AT866666) found 350 M-16 rounds, six M-79 rounds, one bayonet and one gas mask.
- (9) Company G on sweep at 031220H at (AT874663) found 300 light machine gun rounds, 400 AK-47 rounds, five ChiCom grenades, one 60MM mortar round, Chinese manufacture two AK-47 magazines and one machette.
- (10) In the morning, 041110H, Company E during extraction of water cans by helo, received 16 rounds of 82mm mortar fire from vicinity (AT850666) resulting in four friendly WIA's. Gunships fired, artillery and air strikes were called into the area, with unknown results.
- (11) 042030 Company F defensive positions at coordinates (AT862672) heard movement and received four incoming grenades. Co F returned six grenades.
- (12) 042100 Alpha Company received 5-6 rounds of 82mm mortar while in defensive position resulting in one friendly WIA, returned counter-mortar fire. Cowpoke on station but unable to observe results.
- (13) Extraction from Operation (TALLEDEGA CANYON) commenced at 0830 on 5 October and was completed by 0935 at which time BLT participation in the operation terminated.

C. Supporting Arms

- (1) General. The quality and quantity of fire support available was excellent throughout the operation.
- (2) Artillery

During Operation (TALLEDEGA CANYON) 1 October to 5 October 1968, artillery was adequate and responsive to the needs of BLT 2/7. Direct support was provided by Hotel Battery, 3rd Battalion, 11th Marines, the BLT's organic 105mm Howitzer Battery.

During the Operation, Hotel Battery fired a total of 2,309 rounds of HE, and 59 rounds of WP, for a total expenditure of 2,368 rounds. This was accomplished by 21 observed fire missions, mainly prep fires, and numerous H&I fires throughout the BLT's area of operations.

Reinforcing batteries used in the initial prep fires of the BLT's Landing Zone were, Kilo Battery, 3rd Bn, 11th Marines, Mike Battery, 3rd Bn, 11th Marines, Alpha Battery, Field Artillery Group, India Battery, 3rd Bn, 11th Marines, and Golf Battery, 2nd Bn, 11th Marines.

(3) Naval Gunfire

A total of three missions were fired by the USS PROVIDENCE in direct support of the BMT, with excellent coverage of all targets, a total of 70 HE rounds were fired.

(4) Air Support

During operation TALLEDEGA CANYON 1-5 October 1968 the Air Controllers were kept busy with preping LZs and running fixed wing on numerous targets.

Beginning with a flight of B-52's which delivered ordnance on the target area with excellent results. Following the B-52 strike numerous flights of fixed wing were used in direct support of the BMT. A total of 19 fixed wing aircraft were used, expending the following ordnance, 32 canisters of 250 lb Napalm, 48 250 lb bombs, 36 500 lb bombs, 12 750 bombs, numerous 20mm gun rounds, and 228 2.75 rockets were fired.

For the B-52 Strike an accurate account of ordnance could not be compiled. Ordnance delivered by the B-52 strike on Hill 502 (AT833659), Hill 310 (AT863665) and immediate area resulted in the destruction of one bunker complex (3 story level), 10 large bunkers (living), 15 medium fighting bunkers, numerous fighting holes and 200 yards of trench line.

Support from Cowpoke based at Danang was a great asset. A Cowpoke was on station each day to perform visual reconnaissance of the area of Operation, this was a great asset to the Air Controllers. Marine Air Group 16 supported the BMT with the standard ordnance packages, resupply missions and medevac missions.

For night time use flares were provided by KC 130's and Spooky was used on two occasions for flares and protective fires. Coordination between the units involved in the operation was outstanding. All units were included in coordinating the Air Support. Liaison Officers proved great help to air controllers.

d. Logistics(1) General

- (a) A Battalion size LSA was established on 1 Oct 1968 at Hill 55, 7th Marine's Regimental Headquarters with the primary mission of resupplying the operation/units in the field. The LSA was operated by HMT personnel with a representative from the S-1 section, Supply section, Ammunition tech, Ordnance Contact team and Communication-Electronics Contact team. There were no significant resupply problems encountered.
- (b) HMM 165 supported BMT 2/7 for routine resupply with the capability of carrying either internal or external loads. Additionally this squadron provided helicopters for medevac missions.



(2). Maintenance

- (a) Maintenance of organic equipment was performed by LSU contact teams with the exception of work required that attached personnel were not capable of performing. Items in that category were evacuated to Maintenance Battalion, 1st FSR Danang RVN for repairs.
- (b) Four (4) M-60 machine guns, five (5) M-79 grenade launchers were repaired at the ISA by LSU Ordnance Contact teams.
- (c) Two (2) 60MM mortar tubes, one (1) M122 mount and One (1) 81MM mortar mount which were turned into Maintenance Battalion, 1st FSR for repairs.

(3). Transportation

- (a) Transportation for the ISA was provided by organic vehicles which included one (1) M-35 and two (2) M-274A2.

e. Communications

The Communications on this operation were good. The command element was split into Alpha and Bravo Groups, and there were no problems in maintaining contact with all elements and the Battalion Rear at Dai La Pass. Due to high terrain in which the major part of this operation took place, tape antennas sufficed in most cases, though whips were used in the static positions. Two RC-292 antennas were available but were not used.

An SIF representative maintained a retransmission net with the USS TRIPOLI for two days without problems.

The three equipment failures which occurred were repaired in the field by a technician which resulted in short down-time. Extra radios were available in the Command Group but were not required. Battery life was excellent 3 to 4 days being normal life in the PRC-25's.

8. Results(a) Friendly(1) USMC Casualties

(a) Officers: None

(b) Enlisted

KIA:	0
WIAE:	17
WIANE:	3
NBC	11
DOW	1

(2) USN Casualties

(a) Officers: None

(b) Enlisted: None

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## (3) Equipment Damage

- (a) Jeep M-151A1 Destroyed by 75 lb. box mine.

## b. Enemy

## (1) Enemy casualties: None

## (2) Weapons Captured

- (a) (2) SKS rifles
- (b) (4) AK-47's

## (3) Grenades and Mines Captured

- (a) (96) ChiCom grenades

## (4) Ammunition Captured

- (a) 1,085 AK-47 rounds
- (b) (50) SKS rounds
- (c) (410) M-16 rounds
- (d) (14) M-14 rounds
- (e) (2) 60mm rounds (One Chinese manufacture)
- (f) (300) Light Machine gun rounds
- (g) (8) M-79 rounds
- (h) (12) .45 cal. rounds (not U.S. manufacture)
- (i) (10) M-16 rounds

## (5) Miscellaneous Equipment Captured

- (a) (10) AK-47 magazines
- (b) (4) M-16 magazines
- (c) (3) entrenching tools
- (d) (1) NVA helmet, knapsack and ChiCom grenade pouch
- (e) (6) water cans (U.S.)
- (f) (1) Flak jacket (modified by enemy) (U.S.)
- (g) (1) Gas Mask w/2 covers
- (h) (1) machete, bayonet, and canteen cover
- (i) (10) lbs. rice
- (j) Assorted documents

9. Commanders Analysis

Though this operation was not characterized by engagements with the enemy and did not result in confirmed enemy kills, it was nonetheless a success for the BLT. If success in this operation is to be judged it must be judged from the standpoint of effectiveness of the employment of supporting arms, troops and the timely seizure of objectives and not merely from the point of a large body of equipment and arms count. During this operation supporting arms coordination was honed to in fine edge and used to great advantage. The lack of large enemy contact but finds of equipment bear this out. It should be further noted that on the morning of 5 October thirty-one NVA were killed in an ambush

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set by 1st Battalion, 7th Marines close to the operational area, these enemy were travelling in a direction that clearly indicated their having been pushed from the BLT operational area. Greater results in terms of materials captured and enemy killed or captured would have undoubtedly resulted from a more aggressive and interested search of the valley floor by the ARVN Rangers. Their maneuver through Happy Valley reduced their effectiveness in the overall scheme of operation and provided little assistance to the BLT.

Prior to the commencement of this operation the BLT exchanged Liaison Officers with the ARVN Ranger Group. The BLT received one ARVN Ranger Liaison Officer with his accompanying team, one officer and one radio operator was provided by the BLT to each of the two ARVN Ranger Battalions. Through their Liaison Officers the BLT was kept abreast of friendly movements, intentions and changes in tactical thinking. Through little influence could be brought to bear on the decisions of ARVN counterparts, nonetheless it is felt that this means of communication kept the Rangers in the field and in the operational area at least one day longer than they desired. This one day however assisted the BLT if by no means than presenting a threat to enemy forces.

Prior to this operation the BLT had traveled in the field with a sizeable "Alpha" Command Group, leaving all administrative functions in the rear. However on this operation it was decided to test the use of a small "Bravo" command group to encompass such people as the BLT XO, S-4, S-1 representatives and support elements such as a Engineer Plat (-), HST, etc. As a result of this operation it was found that this type of organization, especially in the difficult terrain encountered, created problems and concerns well beyond its value. As an example, security had to be provided, thus tying down tactical units, information had to be passed to one more element, personnel and equipment that usually travelled with the "Alpha" command group was no longer "instantly" available, it was now in the rear. Additionally the larger "Alpha" command group, that was previously employed, provided by dint of numbers, for its own security. During this operation at least one platoon had to be syphoned off to protect this "Alpha" command group, and another to protect the "Bravo" command group. The two groups were merged on the last two days of the operation. In succeeding operations the more satisfactory, single command group in the field has been employed.

*Neil A. Nelson*  
NEIL A. NELSON

HEADQUARTERS  
2nd Battalion, 7th Marines  
9th Marine Amphibious Brigade  
FPO San Francisco, California 96602

3/SRM/mar  
3000  
6 Oct 1968  
Ser. No. 0047-68

Bn. th Marines

Log No. 00197-68

Copy No. 17 of 90

From: Commanding Officer  
To: Commander Task Group 79.5  
Commanding Officer, 7th Marines

Subj: Combat After Action Report (Operation MAUI PEAK)

Ref: (a) CPG 79.5 Operation Plan 129A-67  
(b) MAPS: AMS Vietnam 1:50,000 Series L7014 Sheet 6540 I, 6640 IV

Encl: ✓(1) Operation Overlay for MAUI PEAK

1. Operation MAUI PEAK

2. Data and Locations

- a. Operation (MAUI PEAK) was held in QUANG NAM PROVINCE, RVN and began on 6 October 1968 and was terminated on 17 October 1968.

Command Headquarters:

- a. 061115H-171800H Seventh Marines, Seventh Marines Regimental Combat Base Hill #55 (AT967616).

4. Task Organization

BIF 2/7

Lt Col. N. A. NELSON

H&S Co

1st Lt. J. H. HALSEY II

Det, Hq Bn, 1st Mar Div  
Det, Hq Co, 7th Mar  
Det, Btry H (Rein), 3rd Bn, 11th Mar  
Det, Comm Plat, Hq Co, 7th Mar  
2nd Plat (Rein), Co C, 1st Engr Bn  
Det, LSU For Log Cmd  
Det, Co C, 1st SP Bn  
2nd Plat, Co A, 1st MF Bn

Co E (Rein)

Co E

Det, H&S Co

FAC Tm

FO Tm, 81mm Mortar PEASHINGTON, D. C. ~~REMOVED~~

NGF Spot Tm

Det, Btry H, (Rein), 3rd Bn, 11th Mar

EXTRACTED/REPRODUCED FROM RECORDS OF RICKER

DIVISION OF HISTORY AND MUSEUMS,

HEADQUARTERS, U. S. MARINE CORPS

Tm, 2nd Plat (Rein), Co C, 1st Engr Bn  
 HSF Tm Det, Co C, 1st SP Bn  
 Sniper Tm, 7th Mar Regt  
 Dog Tm, 3rd MP Bn

Co E (Rein)

Capt. R. R. WELPOTT

Co F  
 Det, H&S Co  
 FAC Tm  
 FO Tm, 81mm Mort Plat  
 NGF Spot Tm  
 Det, Btry H (Rein), 3rd Bn, 11th Mar  
 Tm, 2nd Plat (Rein), Co C, 1st Engr Bn  
 HSF Tm Det, Co C, 1st SP Bn  
 Sniper Tm, 7th Mar Regt  
 Dog Tm, 3rd MP Bn

Co G (Rein)

Capt. A. V. LATORRE JR.

Co G  
 Det, H&S Co  
 FAC Tm  
 FO Tm, 81mm Mort Plat  
 NGF Spot Tm  
 Det, Btry H (Rein), 3rd Bn, 11th Mar  
 Tm, 2nd Plat (Rein), Co C, 1st Engr Bn  
 HSF Tm, Det, Co C, 1st SP Bn  
 Sniper Tm, 7th Mar Regt  
 Dog Tm, 3rd MP Bn

EXTRACTED/REPRODUCED FROM RECORDS OF  
 DIVISION OF HISTORY AND MUSEUMS,  
 HEADQUARTERS, U. S. MARINE CORPS  
 WASHINGTON, D. C. 20380

Co H (Rein)

Capt. T. P. E. HOLM

Co H  
 Det, H&S Co  
 FAC Tm  
 FO Tm, 81mm Mort Plat  
 NGF Spot Tm  
 Det, Btry H (Rein), 3rd Bn, 11th Mar  
 Tm, 2nd Plat (Rein), Co C, 1st Engr Bn  
 HSF Tm, Det, Co C, 1st SP Bn  
 Sniper Tm, 7th Mar Regt  
 Dog Tm, 3rd MP Bn

Btry H (Rein), 3rd Bn, 11th Mar

Capt. J. J. JAMES

Mortar Btry (Rein), 3rd Bn, 11th Mar

Capt. J. P. RIORDAN

81mm Mortar Plat

1st Lt. D. J. MCMAHON

EXTRACTED/REPRODUCED FROM RECORDS OF

DIVISION OF HISTORY AND MUSEUMS,

1st Plat, Co E, 1st Recon Bn  
HEADQUARTERS, U. S. MARINE CORPS

1st Lt. W. H. McCLOSKEY

2nd Plat, Co A, 11th ML Bn  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20380

1st Lt. E. T. CHARBONNEAU

5. Intelligencea. Enemy Strength Prior to Operation

- (1) Estimated enemy strength prior to BLT 2/7 being committed to the MAUI PEAK area was 1500 to 2,000 NVA, within a five kilometer radius of the THUONG DUC CIDG Camp. It was reported that in the area to the west of the CIDG Camp between the Song Con and Song Cai rivers three battalions of NVA were located with eight support companies of the 21st Regiment, 2nd NVA Division. An unidentified battalion of the 368B Arty was reported to be located vicinity grid (ZC1555), also an unidentified company of the 141st Regiment, 312th NVA Division was reported vicinity grid (YC7952).

b. Enemy Strength, Mission, and Tactics during the Operation

- (1) The enemy's strength and/or mission could not be determined during the operation insofar as a BLT area of operations was concerned. The enemy avoided major contact, he relied on hit and run tactics utilizing sniper and small arms fire, grenades, rockets and mortars. Indications were that the enemy had moved a battalion sized unit through the operational area before BLT 2/7 moved through.

c. Terrain

BLT 2/7 encountered mountainous terrain with dense brush and a double canopy. The trails were passable and well travelled.

d. Weather

The one unexpected tropical storm caused heavy rains and flooding throughout the area of operation from 11 October to the termination of the Operation.

6. Mission. To find, fix and destroy the enemy in the high ground adjacent to THUONG DUC CIDG Camp and relieve enemy pressure in that area.

7. Executiona. Summary

MAUI PEAK was a multi-battalion Operation involving BLT 2/7, the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 5th Marines; 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines, and 2nd Battalion, 51st ARVN Regiment employed together under command of 7th Marines to relieve pressure on THUONG DUC CIDG Camp then under seige from strong enemy forces.

BLT commenced its landing in LZ VULPINE on 6 October 1968. Along with the rifle companies, the BLT's 4.2 Mortar Battery was also landed at LZ VULPINE and a fire base established there to support BLT 2/7 and other organizations

within range. At 1330 the BMT commenced its move into the canopy west of THUONG DUC with Company "E" in the lead towards Objective A. Due to the lateness of the day and the extremely difficult terrain most units moved under cover of darkness. Life lines were needed to negotiate some of the steep hills as the BMT moved into the thick canopy and undergrowth. Objective A was secured at 1730, the last units reached the position and set in at 2320. During the move to this Objective a report was received that an enemy Battalion was moving from the west to cut off and ambush the BMT.

On the following day the attack continued towards Objective B which contained a large Landing Zone. Prior to departure of attacking units a moderate preparatory fire had been placed on the Objective reinforcing H&I fires delivered in the area the previous night. Upon approaching Objective B, at a stream at the base of the hill which constituted the Objective, fresh enemy positions along with bloody clothing, blood trails and fresh foot marks leading into the stream and eastward were uncovered. The positions were so placed and numerous enough to indicate that this could well be part of the NVA Battalion that was moving to intercept the BMT. This was no doubt intended as the site of an ambush which never came to pass because of accurate and timely H&I and preparatory fires. One of the two unfortunate incidents that took place in BMT 2/7 area of operations occurred on Objective B. When Company "E" and Company "G" consolidated on the Objective and engineers were preparing to destroy enemy mines and booby traps discovered there, a friendly HUVEY gunships flew over the area, returned and delivered 4 to 5 2.75 rockets into the LZ wounding eleven men. Soon thereafter the remainder of the BMT arrived on the Objective and consolidated its positions.

The attack to seize Objective C was initiated with the move of Company "G". At 0645 on 9 October at vicinity of (ZC107533) a fresh ambush position was uncovered. Once again the enemy had been driven off by accurate and timely prep fires, both air and artillery, on the Objective area. Company "H" following in trace of Company "G" placed counter ambush groups (CAGs) at likely ambush sites along the route of approach to Objective C. These were left in place until the entire BMT had moved to and established in the Objective C area. At vicinity (ZC104531) in close proximity to Objective C a two company or larger harboring site was uncovered.

The next 8 days were characterized by the improvement of LZ SHANGRI LA (ZC088553) at Objective B; and the creation of LZ TORTILLA FLATS (ZC103530) and LZ TOLEDO (ZC114521); extensive patrolling from Company patrol bases on Hill 522, Hill 296, (Objective B) and the TORTILLA FLATS area. These patrols covered grids 1152, 1252, 1050, 1051, 1150, 1151, 1251, 1153, 1154, 1253, 1254 on four successive days.

On 11 October a tropical storm closed on the THUONG DUC area with torrential rains and flooding in the valley and lowlands. This rain did not, however, reduce the effectiveness of the BMT's patrolling and killer-ambush effort throughout the area between TORTILLA FLATS and THUONG DUC CIDG Camp. On 15 October Company "H" supported by Company "E" conducted a search and clear Operation in the area of lowground to Route 4, and Cham So'n.

On the afternoon of 14 October Companies "F" and "H", with the BMT Command Group, closed on THUONG DUC CIDG Camp to effect its physical relief and stage units for a planned attack across the SONG CON river into DAI AN. Company "G" moved to a hill just out side of the Camp. Company "E" (Rein) remained at TORTILLA FLATS to provide a security force for the area that might attempt to reenter the area in trace of the BMT. Such an intention had been

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reported on numerous occasions during the progress of the operation.

The attack on DAI AN was delayed due to flooding and finally attempted on 16 October. Its termination was directed when it became clear that the only means of crossing the SONG CON river was by use of native sampans. The bridge was under six feet of swift running water. At this point the second unfortunate incident that took place in the BLT's area of operations occurred. It involved 12 rounds of 155mm artillery fire impacting in THUONG DUC town. This fire was intended to impact some 1,500 meters east and on the southern side of the SONG VU GIA river as prep fires on the BLT's right flank, in support of its attack across SONG CON river. 38 persons were killed and 40 wounded. Many of the wounded were saved and the propaganda value of the incident was reduced by the swift action of the BLT Surgeon and available medical corpsmen, who proceeded immediately to the area, sorted and treated the wounded and dead and initiated medical evacuation by helicopter from THUONG DUC CIDG CAMP.

The next three days were passed improving the defenses of THUONG DUC CIDG Camp and awaiting break in the cloud cover and rain to allow helicopter extraction of the BLT, flooding having made overland movement impossible. Throughout the period 11-16 October resupply virtually ceased due to the heavy weather. BLT units lived on those rations that remained from the last resupply. On 15 October the U. S. Special Forces personnel at THUONG DUC CIDG Camp provided Indigenous Ration (Japanese made Long Range Patrol Ration) in the quantity of two meals per man. This was repeated on the following day. On 16 October a successful air drop of three pallets of rations was made from U. S. Marine Corps fixed wing aircraft. The BLT's delivery landed squarely in the center of the drop zone. This resupply relieved ration shortage.

By 0830 on 17 October the weather had lifted sufficiently to permit the commencement of the helicopter extraction of BLT 2/7 units. The day's lift finished after dusk when the last units of Company "E" were plucked from their mountain perch at LZ TORPILLA FLATS. The remainder of the BLT was lifted out on the morning of 18 October 1968. The lift was completed by 1300 on 18 October when all BLT units arrived at Hill 55.

b. Significant Events

- (1) 060945-061620H - BLT 2/7 commenced Operation MAUI PEAK when the BLT, along with 107mm Mortar Battery, 3rd Battalion, 11th Marines, landed in LZ VULTURE (ZC088574). 107mm Mortar Battery established a Fire Support Base in vicinity of (ZC085572) Company "F" and Company "H" provided security for the Battery.
- (2) 061710H - A M-26 grenade booby-trapped A/P device was detonated within the 107mm Mortar Battery position (ZC088574) wounding one marine. The area was searched for further AP devices with negative results.
- (3) 061735-062045H - The BLT (-) conducted a night movement towards Hill 172 (ZC076564). Although intelligence reported the enemy to be in the area,

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ENCLOSURE (1)



the move to Hill 172 was reached without enemy contact and night defenses were established. Ambushes and IPs were established.

- (4) 062245H - A LP from Second Platoon, Company "H" observed three enemy moving from east to west in a treeline (ZC088573) and fired small arms at the enemy. The LP returned to the company defensive positions after receiving one incoming grenade. The area of contact was searched in the morning with negative results.
- (5) 062245H - A LP from First Platoon, Company "H" spotted three enemy approximately 20 meters away in a treeline (ZC088578) carrying large objects. The LP threw one grenade and fired small arms at the enemy, killing one NVA.
- (6) 070600-071715H - Company "H" moved from LZ VULTURE to Hill 172 and made contact with the BLT (-). Company "F" remained at LZ VULTURE to provide security for the Fire Base. The BLT then attacked toward Hill 600 (ZC088542). The move from Hill 172 to Hill 600 was made without enemy contact. On Hill 600 the BLT (-) established night defensive positions and established ambushes and IPs.
- (7) 080645-080835H - The BLT (-) attacked towards Hill 686 (ZC088535) where Company "G" located a LZ satisfactory for the BLT (-) to accept resupply. Upon approaching the area a fresh ambush site of company size was uncovered, oriented towards BLT 2/7 route of advance.
- (8) 081130H - While searching landing zone on Hill 686 (ZC088535) the BLT (-) received five rockets from a UH1E gunship which was supposed to be prepping another landing zone for a recon insert. 11 Marines were wounded of which six Marines were evacuated.
- (9) 081300H - Company "H" discovered an enemy base camp in the vicinity of (ZC088537). A search of the camp disclosed a cooking area and numerous fighting holes. An enemy pack and khaki uniforms were found.
- (10) 090855H - An NVA helmet with numbers 14-11-67 scratched inside the visor was captured in vicinity of (ZC090535) by Company "G".
- (11) 090945H - While Co E and 81mm Mortar Platoon provided fire support the BLT (-) attacked towards Hill 522 (ZC103530). Company "G" secured the Objective without enemy contact.
- (12) 091030H - Company "H" found a grave containing one NVA while searching vicinity of (ZC091536).
- (13) 091320H - While sweeping in vicinity of (ZC094570) Company "G" found one NVA shirt, one pair sandals, one web belt, and one ChiCom grenade with pouch.
- (14) 091800H - The BLT found an extensive enemy harbor sight of well-constructed fighting holes and bunkers in vicinity of (ZC100529). Enemy fortifications were destroyed. As the BLT entered this area it uncovered a fresh platoon size ambush site oriented towards the BLT's route of advance.

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- (15) 091330H - The B11 ( ) received an order from the Marines to clear additional landing zones around the THUONG DUC area for future quick offensive capabilities. <sup>HILL 296, MARINE CORPS</sup> Company "E" began to clear the LZ nicknamed "SHANGRI LA" (ZC083553). Company "F" commenced clearing an LZ (ZC103530) nicknamed "TORTILLA FLATS". Company "G" commenced clearing an LZ (ZC114521) nicknamed TOLEDO.
- (16) 101650H - While searching for water Company "G" discovered two NVA KIA in vicinity of (ZC107533). The bodies were in green utilities and were wearing packs and cartridge belts.
- (17) 110700H - Company "H" attacked towards Hill 296 (ZC119529).
- (18) 111000H - While reconnoitering area units from Company "G" found an extensive bunker complex and partially dug trenchline (ZC111522). The complex was searched with negative results.
- (19) 111110H - Company "G" secured Hill 400 (ZC113522) without enemy contact. Company "G" set up a combat base and established OPs and conducted patrols.
- (20) 111400H - While attacking towards Hill 296 1st Platoon, Company "H" found one gas mask, assorted AK-47 and carbine ammo, 12.7mm cartridge cases, a large amount of comm wire, one NVA first aid packet, part of a 12.7 anti-aircraft gun sight and one empty rocket canister with markings in an enemy bunker (ZC116525).
- (21) 111620H - Company "H" secured Hill 296 without enemy contact.
- (22) 121555 - While searching area in vicinity of (ZC115525) 3rd Squad, 1st Platoon, Company "H" received small arms fire and grenades from a sniper in a straw hut. The Marines had two minor WIAs. The squad returned fire with small arms and two LAWS, then assaulted the hut. The enemy had escaped.
- (23) 131105H - While on a long range patrol 1st Platoon, Company "H" found seven fighting holes, three bunkers and a grass hut containing one NVA grenade pouch, four NVA ponchos, two NVA utility shirts, two B-40 empty rocket canisters, one bottle of penicillin, one flash light battery, two NVA E-tools, two handpicks, two spools of comm wire, and two canteen covers in vicinity of (ZC113525). The positions were burned and the equipment was destroyed.
- (24) 131315H - While on a long range patrol 2nd Platoon, Company "H" found one NVA body in vicinity of (ZC119528). The KIA's wallet with documents and pictures were turned into S-2.
- (25) 141505H - Command Group "A", Company "F" and Company "H" moved into the CIDG camp at THUONG DUC (ZC143532) to plan future operations in the area. Company "E" remained on Hill 522 (ZC103528) and Company "G" was established on Hill 224 (ZC118535).

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- (26) 151020H DIVE Company "F" and Company "E" were to sweep from the CIDG Camp in THUONG DUC (ZC143532) northeast along Route 4 but were unable to cross the SONHON River due to flooding conditions which had covered the bridge with six feet of water.
- (27) 171300-171930H - Company "F" and Company "H", were extracted from the THUONG DUC area to Hill 55. Company "E" was extracted from Hill 522 (ZC103528), Company "G" and the Alpha Command Group were unable to be extracted because the inclement weather shut down the helo lift.
- (28) 180830-181030H - Company "G" and Alpha Command Group were extracted from the CIDG Camp at THUONG DUC and helo lifted to Hill 55.
- (29) 14-16 October the BLT continued long range patrol activities during daylight and patrols, and established IPs and ambushes at night, without enemy contact
- (30) 11-18 October - During this period heavy rains and monsoons flooded the AO with 39 inches of rainfall, swelling all bodies of water making them unfordable and the lowlands untrafficable. All bridges that were not washed away were under 5-6 feet of water. Inclement weather grounded all helicopter support and made resupply impossible except for few brief breaks in the storm. The health of the BLT was affected with immersion foot, "jungle sores" and resultant cellulitis brought on by the men being constantly wet.

C. Supporting Arms

1. General. During Operation MAUI PEAK from 6-17 October 1968 the quantity and quality of fire support available was excellent throughout the BLT's operational area.
2. Artillery. Artillery support was adequate and responsive to the needs of the BLT. In direct support of BLT 2/7 were Mortar Battery, 3rd Battalion, 11th Marines and Kilo Battery, 3rd Battalion, 11th Marines. The Batteries expended 8,892 HE rounds, 311 WP rounds and 362 Illumination rounds. This was accomplished through 381 observed, 58 unobserved, and 5 registration missions for a total ammunition expenditure of 9,565 rounds. H&I's were fired throughout BLT 2/7 area of operation on suspected enemy harbor sites, ambush sites, and routes of advance.
3. Naval Gunfire. Naval Gunfire was not employed due to the fact that the Operational Area was out of range.
4. Air Support. On the evening of 6 October 1968, Spooky, C-47 gunships, provided fixed wing support for BLT 2/7. On 7 October 1968 four flights of fixed wing were utilized to prep objectives. The ordnance dropped was soft ordnance consisting of 13 Napalm canisters, 12,250 lb bombs, 45, 2.75 rockets and numerous 20mm gun pods. Air and artillery bombardment accounted for the destruction of six bunkers and fighting holes and the suspected anti-aircraft and .50 caliber sights.

Adverse weather conditions throughout the entire operation made it difficult for both resupply and medevacs. Resupply was paraded by a

Marine KC-130 aircraft. Medevacs were taken out by Marine Air Group 16 at Marble Mountain from THUONG DUC CIDG Camp.

d. Logistics

- (1) a. On 6 Oct 1968 a battalion size LSA was established at Hill 55, 7th Marines Regimental Headquarters with the primary mission of re-supplying operating units in the field. The LSA being operated by HSF personnel with the assistance of the following: S-4 Officer, S-1 representative, Supply representatives, Communications Contact Team, Ordnance Contact Team and an ammunition technician.
- b. Helicopter support was provided by 7th Marines for resupply with the capabilities of carrying either internal or external loads, also provided was helicopter support for MEDEVACS. Due to the monsoons helicopter support was limited to support on fair weather days only.
- c. The water resupply point on Hill 55 was used to fill all requirements.

(2) Maintenance

- a. Maintenance of organic equipment was performed by attached Contact Teams with the following items being repaired at the LSA.

- (1) three M-79 Grenade Launchers
- (2) two M-60 Machine Guns
- (3) one 60mm Mortar Tube
- (4) one 81mm Mortar Tube
- (5) two M-92 Sights Mortar 81mm

(3) Transportation

Transportation for the LSA was provided by organic vehicles which consisted of one M-35 truck, two M-27A1, and one M-151A1 these vehicles being utilized to pick up resupply requirements and turn gear in that needed repair at 1st FSK, Danang, RVN.

e. Communications

Communications on this Operation was, at best, satisfactory. The initial insert was at a relatively great distance from the regimental C.P. and this, coupled with double canopy made reliable, direct communications impossible. Initially communications was maintained by relaying traffic through other stations, but as the BIF moved to the higher terrain, direct communication with Regiment became possible.

All traffic was passed over PRC-25s using tape antennas while on the move, and whip and RC-292 antennas when stationary.

There was no battle damage to equipment, although two PRC-25s became inoperative due to excessive moisture within the body housing.

8. Resultsa. Friendly

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## (1) USMC Casualties

- (a) Officer : None  
 (b) Enlisted

KIA : None  
 WIA : 10  
 NBC : 21  
 WIANE : 17

## (2) USN Casualties

- (a) Officers: None  
 (b) Enlisted : D.O.C. 1

(c) Equipment Damage : None

b. Enemy

## (1) Personnel

- (a) NVA KIA : 3  
 (b) VC KIA : 1  
 (c) Detainees : None  
 (d) Chieu Hoi : None

(2) Weapons Captured - None

(3) Grenades and Mines Captured - (1) 40lb box mine

(4) Ammunition Captured (by rounds) - assorted AK-47 and carbine rounds; destroyed

(5) Miscellaneous Equipment Captured

- (a) Miscellaneous NVA clothing  
 (b) Miscellaneous individual combat gear  
 (c) (1) wallet with documents and photos  
 (d) (1) Gas mask  
 (e) (1) bottle medicine  
 (f) (1) part of 12.75 A A gun sight  
 (g) (2) Rolls of communication wire (spooled 29 GAG)  
 (h) (2) 13-B-40 rocket cannisters (empty)

9. Commanders Analysis

As with the operation that immediately preceded this one, TALLADEGA CANYON, no major engagements took place between BLT 2/7 units and NVA units. This was surprising, as much of the fire delivered into THUONG DUC CIDG Camp in the past weeks had been from this area. Again, as in the previous operation, accurate and

timely prep fires followed up by an attack into the objectives probably accounts for the lack of enemy. Additionally this terrain does not afford good fields of fire, observation etc, and is generally not the sort of place in which the NVA normally chose to stand and fight. It is, however, excellent ambush country and contains many well concealed harboring sites and well used trails.

The tough terrain and deteriorating weather encountered on this operation made for slow, deliberate movement and often reduced visibility to one's immediate area. However, troop morale remained high, amazingly so in view of the poor weather and rugged terrain which was soon coupled with a food shortage, immersion foot, "jungle sores" and accompanying cellulitis. In this operation the troops proved once again the tremendous flexibility that Marine Corps training has built into the individual Marine and Marine leader, and demonstrated his endurance and staying power to be equal to that of any Marine that has gone before him.

The emergency resupply of rations by an air drop from fixed wing aircraft was eminently successful in the case of BMT 2/7. The drop was exactly on target, dropped from a very low altitude with no damage to the rations dropped.

Considering the weather and inaccessibility of the terrain in which the BMT operated, support, both combat and combat service was excellent. It was clearly evident that all hands were doing more than their share to render support to the Battalion in the field.

The fact that pressure was relieved from THUONG DUC CIDG Camp and that in fact the enemy completely lifted his seige and fires by 12 October are clear evidence that the operation was successful.


*N. A. Nelson*

N. A. NELSON

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Annex C (Operations Overlay) to Frag Order 100-68

MAPS: VIETNAM, 1:50,000, Series L7014 Sheet 6640 IV




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ENCLOSURE 1

(A)



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
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PART II GO NOI ISLAND AREA

Annex C (Operations Overlay) to Frag Order 124-68

Map: Vietnam, 1:50,000 Series L7014 Sheet 6640 IV

D-Day (17 Dec 68)



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N. A. NELSON  
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
Commanding

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Enclosure (2)

(B)


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PART III Defense of Southern Approaches to AN HOA Combat Base


Annex C (Operations Overlay) to Frag Order 125-68

Map: Vietnam, 1:50,000 Series L7014 Sheet 664C IV

D-Day (20 Dec 68)



- Objective 1-Phu Nhuan (6)
- 2 " " (9)
- 3 " " (7)



*N. A. Nelson*  
 N. A. NELSON  
 Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
 Commanding

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Enclosure (3)


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PART III Defense of Southern Approaches to AN HOA  
Combat Base

Annex C (Operations Overlay) to Frag Order 126-68

Map: Vietnam, 1:50,000 Series L7014 Sheet 6640 IV

D-Day (21 Dec 68)



*N. A. Nelson*

N. A. NELSON  
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
Commanding

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Enclosure (4)

HEAD QUARTERS  
2nd Battalion, 7th Marines  
9th Marine Amphibious Brigade  
APO San Francisco, California 96602

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3/EMD/mar  
3000  
12 Nov 1968  
Ser. No. 0048-68

Div. 7th Marines  
Log No. 0019 - 6  
Copy No. 17 of 90

From: Commanding Officer  
To: Commander, Task Group 79.5  
Commanding Officer, 7th Marines

Subj: Combat After Action Report (Operation SABINE DRAW)

Ref: (a) CTG 79.5 Operation Plan 120A-67  
(b) Maps: AMS Vietnam 1:50,000 Series L7014 Sheet 6640 IV

Encl: ✓(1) Operation overlay for DODGE CITY Area  
-(2) BLM Frag Order 90-68 *See Chron*

1. Operation SABINE DRAW
2. Date and Location

Operation SABINE DRAW, DODGE CITY Area, QUANG NAM PROVINCE, RVN began on 28 October 1968 and terminated on 1 Nov 1968.

3. Command Headquarters

280700-012000 - Seventh Marines, Seventh Marines Regimental Combat Base, Hill 55 (AT96746).

4. Task Organization

BLM 2/7

LtCol. N. A. NELSON

H&S Co (-) (Rein)

Capt. J. T. FRICKER

Det, Hq Bn, 1st Mar Div  
Det, Hq Co, 7th Mar  
Det, Btry H, (Rein), 3rd Bn, 11th Mar  
Det, Comm Plat, Hq Co, 7th Mar  
2nd Plat (Rein), Co C, 1st Engr Bn  
Det, LSU, For Log Cmd  
Det, Co C, 1st SP Bn  
2nd Plat, Co A, 1st MI Bn

Co E (Rein)

Capt. A. R. NELSON

Co E  
Det, H&S Co  
FAC Tm  
FO Tm, 81mm Mort Plat  
Det, Btry H (Rein), 3rd Bn, 11th Mar

~~SECRET~~

Tm, 2nd Plat (Rein), Co C, 1st Engr Bn  
H&S Tm, Det, Co C, 1st SF Bn

Co F (Rein)

Capt. R. R. WELPOTT

Co F  
Det, H&S Co  
FAC Tm  
FO Tm, 81mm Mort Plat  
Det, Btry H (Rein), 3rd Bn, 11th Mar  
Tm, 2nd Plat (Rein), Co C, 1st Engr Bn  
H&S Tm, Det, Co C, 1st SF Bn

Co G (Rein)

Capt. A. V. LATORRE

Co G  
Det, H&S Co  
FAC Tm  
FO Tm, 81mm Mort Plat  
Det, Btry H (Rein), 3rd Bn, 11th Mar  
Tm, 2nd Plat (Rein), Co C, 1st Engr Bn  
H&S Tm, Det, Co C, 1st SF Bn

Co H (Rein)

Capt. T. P. E. HOLM

Co H  
Det, H&S Co  
FAC Tm  
FO Tm, 81mm Mort Plat  
Det, Btry H (Rein), 3rd Bn, 11th Mar  
Tm, 2nd Plat (Rein), Co C, 1st Engr Bn  
H&S Tm, Det, Co C, 1st SF Bn

Btry H (Rein), 3rd Bn, 11th Mar

Capt. J. J. JAMES

Mortar Btry (Rein), 3rd Bn, 11th Mar

Capt. J. P. RIORDAN

81mm Mort Plat

1st Lt. D. J. MCMAHON

2nd Plat, Co A, 11th MT Bn

1st Lt. E. T. CHARBONNEAU

5. Intelligence

a. Enemy Strength Prior to Operation

Prior to Operation (SABINE DRAW), one unidentified battalion of the 36th NVA Regiment, plus the 36th Regimental CP with support companies were reported to be operating in the following locations: (AT959565), (AT969575), (AT974558), and (AT992614). Other Battalion size units were reported as possibly being in the operational area.

b. Enemy Strength, Mission and Tactics during the Operation

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During the operation the enemy evaded contact with BLP 2/7. The enemy left indications that he had been in the area in battalion strength but withdrew prior to the commencement of the operation. Due to the lack of contact the missions and tactics of the enemy are undetermined.

e. Terrain

The terrain within the area of operations consisted of flooded rice paddies and scattered treelines. Due to the recent heavy rains there were few locations within the area of operation that were not inundated. Due to the policy of the BLP to prep all treelines prior to assaulting, defensive positions within treelines were partly if not completely demolished. Vehicular movement was impossible and foot movement was slowed due to the flooded paddies and swollen condition of the rivers and lakes.

d. weather

Weather during the operation was generally fair, with a few early morning showers. The BLP suffered no adverse effects from the weather.

6. Mission

For Operation SABINE DRAW, BLP 2/7 was to conduct a detailed search and clear operation within the area of operation (see enclosure (1)) to capture or destroy enemy forces, material, fortifications and caches.

Execution

a. Concept

BLP 2/7 moved to the line of departure at 0300 on 28 October and at first light moved to the northeastern portion of the area of operation and conducted search and clear operations. (See enclosure (1) for scheme of maneuver and search sectors). The BLP swept south from Route 4 to the SONG THU BON river. The BLP then conducted search and clear operations to the northwestern portion of the area of operation. While the BLP was conducting operations, units from the 51st ARVN Regiment, and the 5th Marines established blocking forces along the enemy routes of egress from the BLP area of operation. Upon completion of the search and clearance of area of operation the BLP swept Route 4 back to Golden Gate Bridge and Hill 55. The Operation was terminated at 1800 on 1 Nov 1968 and all units of the BLP returned to Hill 55 by 2000 on 1 Nov 1968.

b. Significant Events

- (1) 280300-280555H - Under cover of darkness the BLP moved to the LD (AT968 601) and was prepared to commence the attack towards Objective L (AT 960576) at 0555 on 28 October.
- (2) 280735H - Company "E" discovered 400 lbs of shelled and unshelled rice as well as 800 lbs of corn in vicinity of (AT960576) while sweeping area. All supplies were destroyed.

- UNCLASSIFIED
- (3) 280945H - Company "E" found 18 children and nine women in vicinity of AT961571. The Vietnamese were safeguarded as detainees and moved to the BMT CP for interrogation.
  - (4) 281300H - Company "E" found one canteen, one sandbag full of rice, one utility shirt, and 100 ft of nylon rope in vicinity of AT962976. All equipment was destroyed.
  - (5) 281354H - Company "E" discovered fresh graves in vicinity of AT963573 while on a company sweep. The graves were opened to disclose the remains of seven VC. No accompanying equipment or clothing were found.
  - (6) 281405H - A squad patrol from Company "F" spotted five enemy planting some object on Route 4 (AT956584). The enemy spotted the patrol from Company "F" at the same time and ran out of effective small arms range before the patrol could bring fire to bear. The patrol searched the area where the enemy had been on the road with negative results.
  - (7) 281515H - Company "F" found one NVA pack, which appeared to have been in the area a considerable length of time, while on a company sweep in vicinity of AT958572. A more thorough search of the area disclosed one E-tool, one B-40 rocket warhead, a one lb block of C-4 and a poncho. All equipment was turned into S-2 for close examination.
  - (8) 282030H - While searching the area in vicinity of AT961567, Company "E" found 37 blasting caps, two M-14 cartridges and various documents. All equipment was destroyed and the documents were forwarded to S-2 for further study.
  - (9) 290825H - Company "F" an NVA siting (AT955569) to include four recently built bunkers. The enemy position was destroyed.
  - (10) 290920H - The BMT security element for the command group found miscellaneous NVA clothing, three lbs of C-4, one B-40 rocket warhead, one RPD machinegun drum-magazine containing 75 rounds of ammunition, and two small bottles of penicillin while searching vicinity of the site of the BMT CP (AT961575).
  - (11) 291500H - While searching in vicinity of AT955567, Company "F" found nineteen B-40 rockets and boosters, four RPDs, two 25 lb shaped charges, two E-tools, 10 lbs of TNT, 8 lbs of C-4, ten blasting caps, 50 feet of electrical taps, one AK-47 magazine, 30 rounds of 38 caliber ammunition seven ChiCom had grenades, 380 rounds of AK-47 ammunition, one AP mine, one 45 caliber pistol holster, 500 lbs of corn, 150 lbs of rice, 10 lbs of tobacco and one canteen. All supplies and equipment were turned over to S-2.
  - (12) 292000H - While searching in vicinity of AT955567, Company "F" found 200 lbs of corn and 200 lbs of rice along with five fish nets, five bundles of fish line and ten items of clothing, and three papers that were

possibly of importance. Fresh foot prints led away from the gear.

- (13) 301000H - The 3rd Bn, 51st ARVN, who had been effecting a blocking force on the western area of operation (see enclosure (1)), were pulled out of the area of operation and returned to their own TAOR.
- (14) 301130H - Company "H" found enemy trenchlines including heavy bunkers in vicinity of AT952550.
- (15) 301230H - While on a company sweep Company "H" found six women and six children in vicinity of AT950554. These detainees were turned over to S-2 for interrogation.
- (16) 301540H - Company "F" found 1000 lbs of corn and 1500 lbs of rice in vicinity of AT951559. A further search of the area immediately around the grain cache yielded various eating utensils, NVA clothing, tobacco, 200 AK-47 rounds, one M-33 grenade, one M-26 grenade, 12 M-79 rounds, one cigarette lighter, one NVA canteen and one bag of seeds. The eating utensils and grain were destroyed and the other equipment and supplies were turned over to S-2.
- (17) 301750H - Personnel from Company "F" dug up fresh graves to find two NVA bodies with multiple shrapnel wounds in vicinity of AT957555. The bodies were buried with helmets and packs. The equipment was turned into S-2 for evaluation.
- (18) 310730H - Company "E" found five children and two women and one old man in vicinity of AT950561. These detainees were taken to S-2 for interrogation and safeguarding.
- (19) 310800H - While searching in vicinity of AT940556, Company "F" found 825 lbs of rice and 55 lbs of corn and two lbs of marijuana as well as one AK-47 magazine, documents and one freshly skinned chicken. The rifle magazine and documents were forwarded to S-2 and all other supplies were burned.
- (20) 310800H - Company "E" found 300 lbs of rice, 300 lbs of corn and ten rounds of 30 caliber ammunition, while searching in vicinity of AT951559.
- (21) 310850H - while searching Company "F" observed movement in a treeline (AT954555) in which an 81mm mortar mission was being fired. Company "F" adjusted the 81mm mortar mission and fired machine guns at the movement. One platoon then assaulted the treeline but could not find no trace of the enemy.
- (22) 311350H - The command group of BHP 2/7 had a secondary explosion while burning and destroying huts and bunkers (AT951559). The command group and security group continued to search the area and destroyed the huts and bunkers.



- (23) 311425H - Company "E" received sporadic AK-47 and carbine rounds from vicinity of AT945567. Company "E" returned small arms and automatic weapons fire from their position in vicinity of AT949564. 81mm mortars and artillery were used to eliminate the enemy fire. A VC squad with two wounded was later observed fleeing the area in a westerly direction.
- (24) 010800H - Company "E" found a bunker and tunnel complex (AT945570) reinforced by steel girders. C-4 was used to destroy the bunkers.
- (25) 011400H - Company "G" while searching took one WIA when a Marine tripped an anti-personnel booby trap (AT936575).
- (26) 011735H - While providing security for road sweep on Route 4 (AT973579). Company "H" received 100 rounds of sniper fire. Company "H" set down a base of fire and one platoon immediately assaulted the treeline from which the enemy fire came, with negative results.

c. Supporting Arms

(1) Artillery

For the period 28 October 1968 to 1 Nov 1968, Operation SABINE DRAW, artillery support was adequate and responsive to the needs of the BIF. Besides the BIF's organic batteries, Hotel Battery, 3rd Bn, 11th Marines and Mortar Battery, 3rd Bn, 11th Marines, artillery support was provided by India Battery, 3rd Bn, 11th Marines, and Lima Battery, 4th Bn, 11th Marines.

During the operation 4,709 rounds of HE, 49 rounds WP, and three rounds illumination were expended. This was accomplished by 40 observed missions and 11 unobserved missions. A total of 4,961 rounds were expended. H&Is were fired on suspected enemy locations and routes of advance.

(2) Naval Gunfire

There was no Naval Gunfire used on Operation SABINE DRAW because the area of operations was beyond the range of all but 16" guns which were not available for the operation.

(3) Air Support

- (a) CAS - BIF 2/7 used three flights of fixed wing consisting of F-4Bs these planes dropped light ordnance consisting of ten 250 lb bombs, nine 400 lb napalm canisters and expended 16 unit rockets. 70 meters of trenchline, three living structures and one bunker were destroyed. Close Air Support was not utilized to a greater extent because contact with the enemy was limited.
- (b) TPQ-10s - No TPQ-10s were used due to the lack of fixed enemy targets.
- (c) Flareships - Flareships were not used during Operation SABINE DRAW. There was substantial moonlight to conduct night activities and there was no nocturnal enemy contact to warrant night illumination.

- (d) AOs - The BIF used the OV-10B aircraft extensively to guide air support and adjust artillery.
- (e) Medevacs - BIF 2/7 had a total of ten medevacs during Operation SABINE DRAW. All casualties were evacuated to 1st Medical Battalion in Danang.

d. Logistics

- (1) On 28 October 1968 a battalion size LSA was established on Hill 55, 7th Marines Regimental Headquarters with the mission of supporting the Battalion while employed on Operation SABINE DRAW. The LSA was operated by HSP personnel with the support of the following personnel: S-1 representative; supply representative; Contact Team; and an Ammunition Technician.
- (2) Helicopter support was provided by 7th Marine Regiment for resupply with the capabilities of external or internal loads depending on the terrain and circumstance's of the operations, this also included the helicopter support for medevac missions.
- (3) The water resupply point on Hill 55 was utilized to fill all required needs. Water being sent out to the field in plastic water containers proved to be the most feasible since it did not hinder the units with having to carry or evacuate.

e. Communications

Communications on this operation was very good. The distances involved were relatively short and the only problems encountered were mutual interference between the artillery and battalion NET and infrequent interference of the battalion TAC NET by an unknown station. A frequency shift on the Battalion TAC NET remedied both problems.

The only items of equipment which went down were two handsets, and these were replaced by spares. Whip and tape antennas were used while on the move, and the RC-292 was used on the regimental tac net when the command group was stationary.

8. Results

a. Friendly

(1) USMC

- (a) 2 WIAE
- (b) 1 WIANE
- (c) 1 NBC KIA
- (d) 6 NBCE

(2) USN

None

(3) Equipment

There was no loss or breakdown of equipment on this Operation.

b. Enemy(1) Casualties

(a) NVA KIA	2
(b) VC KIA	7
(c) Detainees	69
(d) Chieu Hoi	None

(2) Weapons captured - None(3) Grenades and Mines Captured - Two AP mines(4) Ammunition captured by rounds

(a) AK-47	530
(b) SKS	50
(c) B-40 rocket round dud	1
(d) 3.5 round dud	1
(e) 7.62 short rounds	30
(f) B-40 rocket rounds	4
(g) RPG rounds	4

(5) Miscellaneous Equipment Captured

(a) Rice	3,395 lbs
(b) Corn	1,855 lbs
(c) Salt	2 lbs
(d) B-40 rocket boosters	19
(e) 25 lb shape charges	2
(f) TNT	10 lbs
(g) C-4	8 lbs
(h) Blasting caps	47
(i) AK-47 magazines	1
(j) Electrical tape	50 feet
(k) Communication wire	2 rolls
(l) sewing machine	1
(m) Assorted clothing	
(n) Assorted individual combat gear	
(o) Assorted cooking utensils	
(p) First Aid Kit	

9. Commander's Analysis

Operation (SABINE DRAW) ran very smoothly, produced significant finds in terms of enemy materials and food stuffs and very little contact with the enemy. The success of this Operation is attributed in large part to three things:

- a. Extensive movement during periods of darkness and reduced visibility. From first to last movement to attack positions was made, when ever possible, under cover of darkness. The initial entry into the operational area was made in this way as was the withdrawal of the main body on the evening of 1 November 1968.
- b. Extensive use of artillery on an objective. No "sweeps" were conducted. All Objectives were taken using fire and maneuver. Extensive searches followed the seizure and consolidation on an objective.
- c. The objectives were spaced at reasonable distances apart and search sectors were kept to a reasonable size to assure a thorough and unhurried search.



The results were small friendly casualties, no significant enemy contact, a large number of detainees taken, significant equipment, and ammunition taken, large quantities of food stuffs found and destroyed, bunker and tunnel complexes found and destroyed. It was a good operation, that went as planned and as scheduled. Momentum was kept up. The only sour note was the withdrawal of ARVN forces on the third day of the operation and the fact that they did not take all objectives, thoroughly search assigned area nor did they set in an effective block. Once again, as with Operation TALLEDEGA CANYON, the BIF exchanged Liaison Officers. However in this case the 51st ARVN Regiment did not provide a Liaison Officer to accompany the BIF. The BIF Liaison Officer with the 3rd Bn, 51st ARVN Regiment did keep the BIF Commander well informed of happenings in the ARVN area. It was through this source that it became evident that the ARVN Battalion Commander intended to withdraw on the third day of the operation. Once again the effective use of a Liaison Officer paid dividends in terms of preparing the BIF Commander to make valid decisions and timely recommendations to his senior, Commanding Officer, 7th Marines.

*N. A. Nelson*  
N. A. NELSON

Ledgent

OPERATION OVERLAY SABINE DRAW

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Sheets 6640IV




ENCLOSURE 1

Frag Order 87-68

Ref: (a) BLP 2/7 Oplan 1-68 (Notal)  
 (b) My Frag 86-68  
 (c) My Frag 80-68

Time Zone: Hotel



1. SITUATION. No change from Ref (b).

2. MISSION. No change from Ref (b).

3. EXECUTION

a. Concept of Operation. During the day of 22 Oct and night of 22-23 Oct 1968 rifle companies conduct short range patrols, ambushes, and similar activities in close proximity to Hill #55.

b. Co E, F, G, H Reinforced

(1) Commencing 0730 22 Oct 1968 conduct sweeps, patrols, set ambushes and conduct similar activities in assigned areas.

(2) Additionally Co G conduct road sweep towards 1st Marines TAOR.

(3) Attachments are as shown in ref (b).

(4) Co E, Co F and Co G activities conclude 1700 22 Oct 1968.

(5) Co G activities continue through BMOF 24 Oct 1968.

(6) Co E, F and G be prepared to conduct sweep in Sector 2 commencing Bmnt 23 Oct 1968. See ref (c) for full details.

c. Coordinating Instructions. See paragraph 3.0 ref (b).

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. No change.

5. COMMAND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS. See ref (b).

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OVER WIRE CIRCUITS OR BY MESSENGER.

*Neil A. Nelson*  
 NEIL A. NELSON

Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
 Commanding

DISTRIBUTION: 7th Marines (5)  
 BLP 2/7 (20)  
 3rd Bn, 1st Mar (3)  
 3rd Bn, 1st Mar (1)

TAB E [REDACTED] (1)

TAB (E)


Frag Order 88-68

95  
+61

Ref: (a) BHT 2/7 Oplan 1-68 (Notal)  
 (b) My Frag 86-68  
 (c) My Frag 87-68

Time Zone: Hotel

1. SITUATION. No change from ref (b).
2. MISSION. No change from ref (b).
3. EXECUTION



- a. Concept of Operation. Commencing BMNT 23 Oct 1968, with three rifle companies, conduct a sweep of that portion of Sector 2 east of Golden Gate Bridge road and south of Son La Tho river.
  - (1) At BMNT be in position shown, ready to commence sweep south.
  - (2) On order, commence sweep south with particular attention to possible harbor and cache sites.
- b. Co E and F (Rein)
  - (1) At BMNT be in position shown, ready to commence sweep south.
  - (2) On order, commence sweep south with particular attention to possible harbor and cache sites.
- c. Co G (Rein)
  - (1) At BMNT take up defensive positions vic Golden Gate Bridge, be prepared to follow in trace of Co E and F when they have crossed Phase Line Rinso.
  - (2) Be prepared to assume the mission of eight Co E or Co F, provide a blocking force, or perform an independant mission.
  - (3) Conduct road sweep towards 1st Marines TAOR and conduct short range patrols and activities in areas shown for Co G and Co E see Ref (C).
- d. 81mm Mortar Platoon
  - (1) Two sections in General Support.
  - (2) Be prepared to displace
- e. All other units. No change.
- f. BHT Reserve
  - (1) Co G (Rein)
  - (2) Continue activities outlined in ref (c).
  - (3) Be prepared under cover of sweep to east of road leading to Route 4, to conduct road sweep to junction of that road and Route 4.

+58  
99Coordinating Instructions

- (1) See paragraph 3.0 of ref (b).
- (2) Contact right to left

TAB F

ENCLOSURE (1)

(3) Cross phase lines on order only. Unless in cross fursuit of the enemy.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. No change

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS. See ref (b).

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OVER WIRE CIRCUITS OR BY MESSENGER.



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TAB F

ENCLOSURE (1)

F-1-2



Frag Order 89-68


93  
59+

(a) My Frag 86-68

Time Zone: Hotel

1. SITUATION: No change from ref (a).
2. MISSION: No change from ref (a).
3. EXECUTION

- a. Concept of Operation. With two rifle companies (Rein) conduct a five day clear and search operation in Section 3 and 4 (see Ref (a)). Upon completion of this operation normal operations, as outlined in ref (a), will commence in this area.

Co E (Rein)

- (1) On order move to assembly area vic of Golden Gate Bridge by 0500 on date to be designated.
- (2) On order assume point and flank security for Bn main body, move south on Golden Gate Bridge Road to junction with Route 4, thence along Route 4 to assembly area shown above. Occupy and defend assembly area perimeter from 9 0'clock to 3 0'clock.
- (3) On order move to attack position along north side of Route 4, to the west of Co F (Rein)
- (4) On order attack, seize and secure Objective A. Be prepared to assist in the seizure of Objective B.
- (5) On order commence detailed Search of area assigned, additionally conduct extensive day and night activities.
- (6) Be prepared to continue the attack.

Co F (Rein)

- (1) On order move to assembly area vic of Golden Gate Bridge by 0500 on date to be designated.
- (2) On order assume rear point security for Bn main body, move south on Golden Gate bridge road to junction with Route 4, thence along Route 4 to assembly area shown above. Occupy and defend assembly area perimeter from 3 0'clock to 9 0'clock.
- (3) On order move to attack position along north side of Route 4 to the east side of Co E (Rein).
- (4) On order attack, seize and secure Objective B. Be prepared to assist Co E (Rein) in the seizure of Objective A.
- (5) On order commence detailed search of area assigned, additionally conduct extensive day and night activities.
- (6) Be prepared to continue the attack.

97  
54+TAB G  
ENCLOSURE (1)

G-1-1

D. Co G (-) (Rein)

- (1) On order move to assembly area of Golden Gate Bridge by 0500 on date to be designated.
- (2) Move with main body to assembly area and assume defensive positions within the perimeter.
- (3) On order move in trace of attacking companies, providing security for the Alpha Command Group.
- (4) Be prepared to assume the mission/tasks of either Co E or Co F, assist them in the attack or perform an independent mission.

E. 81mm Mortar Platoon

- (1) Two sections in General Support.
- (2) Be prepared to displace on order.

F. All other units. No change.G. Coordinating Instructions

- (1) See paragraph 3.0, ref (a).
- (2) Contact Left to Right.
- (3) The order to be executed on order.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. No change5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS. See ref (a).

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT BY WIRE OR MESSENGER



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Commanding

TAB G

ENCLOSURE (1)

Frag Order 90-68

- Ref: (a) My Frag 86-68  
 (b) My Frag 87-68  
 (c) 7th Marines Frag 86-68 (NOTAL)

Time Zone: Hotel

1. SITUATION. Enemy units believed to be operating in the vicinity and their latest reported positions are : C5 Sapper Co (AT957575); E36th NVA Regt CP (AT959565); One UI Bn, 38th Regt (AT969575); 36th Bn (AT974558), C1st Co, C89th Sapper Bn (AT992614).
2. MISSION  
 Commencing at H-Hour on D-Day one USMC Battalion (Rein) in coordination and co-operation with one ARVN Battalion conducts detailed search operation within AO to capture or destroy enemy forces, materials, fortifications and caches.
3. EXECUTION
  - a. Concept of Operation. See Operation and Sector Search Overlays. One USMC Battalion and ARVN Battalion move overland to vicinity Northern boundary AO, conduct deliberate search and clear operation in AO. USMC Battalion on the east, ARVN Battalion on the west of AO. 5th Marines and 7th Marines provide screening forces along North, East and South boundaries.
  - b. Co E (Rein)
    - (1) On D-Day provide guides and marking team for LD.
    - (2) On D-Day on order move to attack position at LD, deploy at LD.
    - (3) On order, in coordination with Co F (Rein), attack, seize and secure Obj. L
    - (4) On order commence detailed search of sub-sector assigned, additionally conduct extensive day and night activities.
    - (5) Be prepared to continue the attack.
  - c. Co F (Rein)
    - (1) On order, move in trace of Co E (Rein) to LOD, deploy in attack position along LD to west of Co E (Rein).
    - (2) On order, in coordination with Co E (Rein), attack, seize and secure Obj. L
    - (3) On order commence detailed search of sub-sector assigned, additionally conduct extensive day and night activities.
    - (4) Be prepared to continue the attack.
  - d. Co G (Rein)
    - (1) On order, move in trace of Co F (Rein) to vic of LD.
    - (2) Provide security for Alpha Command Group.
    - (3) Be prepared to provide assistance in the attack on Obj. L.
    - (4) On order move to selected activity base, commence detailed search of sub-sector assigned, additionally conduct extensive day and night activities.
    - (5) Be prepared to continue the attack.

TAB H 1-1

ENCLOSURE 2

e. 8mm Mortar Platoon

- (1) General Support
- (2) Established firing position in vicinity of blocking force on northern boundary of AO.
- (3) Be prepared to displace on order.

f. BLT Reserve

- (1) Co H (Rein)
- (2) Day and night of D<sub>-</sub>Day<sub>-</sub>1 insert activities that will provide security for movement of battalion down Golden Gate Bridge road to LD. Provide security for marking team and guides at LD.
- (3) Upon passage of Battalion main body and commencement of the attack on Obj. L., pull in all activities and move to assembly area in vicinity of LD.
- (4) On order move to LD, assume security for Alpha Command Group and move to Obj L.
- (5) Establish defensive positions at vic Obj. L., conduct short range activities vicinity of Obj. L.
- (6) Be prepared to continue the attack.

g. All other units. No changeh. Coordinating Instruction

- (1) See paragraph 3.0 Ref (a)
- (2) Contact left to right
- (3) D<sub>-</sub>Day 28 Oct 1968
- (4) H<sub>-</sub>Hour 0620
- (5) Co G and Co H will be relieved of TAOR responsibilities, see Ref (b), NLT 271200 Oct 1968.
- (6) Operation Nickname: SABINE DRAW
- (7) Submit night activities plan to this HQ NLT 1700 daily.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. See Ref (c).

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS ELECTRONICS. See Ref (c).

*Neil A. Nelson*  
NEIL A. NELSON

Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps  
Commanding

~~SECRET~~

2 bn. 7th Marines

Log No. 00177-68Copy No. 21 of 35Copy 21 of 35 copies

BLT 2/7

NUI DAT SON, RVN

212000H Oct 1968

LYZ

FRAG ORDER 86-68

- A. MAPS AMS RVN 1:50,000, SERIES L7014 SHEETS 6640 IV
- B. 7TH MARINES 180850Z OCT 68
- C. CG 1ST MARDIV OP ORD 301-68
- D. BLT 2/7 OPLAN 1-68 (NOTAL)
- E. BLT 2/7 ADMIN PLAN 2-68 (NOTAL)
- F. BNO 1610.5 (INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY) (NOTAL)
- G. 7TH MARINES CECI (NOTAL)

TIME ZONE: HOTEL

7thMar S&amp;C Log Nr.

0049-69 Copy# 10/1

1. SITUATION
  - A. ENEMY SITUATION: CURRENT INTSUMS, PERINTREPS AND ANNEX C (INTELLIGENCE).
  - B. FRIENDLY FORCES: REF C AND ANNEX B (OPERATIONS OVERLAY).
  - C. ATTACHMENTS: ANNEX A (TASK ORGANIZATION). ALL ATTACHMENTS EFFECTIVE 211800H OCT 68.
2. MISSION
 

OUTPOST AND PROVIDE SECURITY FOR GOLDEN GATE BRIDGE AND CONDUCT AGGRESSIVE OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS AND PATROLS THROUGHOUT TAOR TO DESTROY THE ENEMY AND DENY HIM ACCESS TO THE AREA.
3. EXECUTION
  - A. CONCEPT OF OPERATION. SEE ANNEX B (OPERATIONS OVERLAY). RIFLE COMPANIES REINFORCED ASSIGNED SECTORS OF THE BLT TAOR DENY ENEMY ACCESS AND USE OF THESE SECTORS BY VIGOROUS PATROLLING, SETTING OF AMBUSHES AND SIMILAR ACTIVITIES, EMPLOYING TO THE MAXIMUM AVAILABLE SUPPORTING ARMS.
  - B. CO E (REIN). ESTABLISH IN SECTOR 4 AND CONDUCT COMPANY OPERATIONS, PATROLS AND OTHER ACTIVITIES TO DENY THE USE OF THAT SECTOR TO THE ENEMY.
  - C. CO F (REIN). ESTABLISH IN SECTOR 3 AND CONDUCT COMPANY OPERATIONS, PATROLS AND OTHER ACTIVITIES TO DENY THE USE OF THAT SECTOR TO THE ENEMY.
  - D. CO G (REIN)
    - (1) ESTABLISH IN SECTOR 1 AND CONDUCT COMPANY OPERATIONS, PATROLS AND OTHER ACTIVITIES TO DENY THE USE OF THAT SECTOR TO THE ENEMY.
    - (2) DAILY, PROVIDE A SQUAD (REIN) AS SECURITY FOR THE SWEEP OF ROAD LEADING NORTHEAST TO 1ST MARINES TAOR. DETAILS OF ROAD SWEEP PROCEDURES WILL BE CONTAINED IN A SEPERATE DIRECTIVE.

ENCLOSURE (3)

-1-

ENCLOSURE (3)

~~SECRET~~

1782

E. CO H (REIN)

- (1) ESTABLISH IN SECTOR 2 AND CONDUCT COMPANY OPERATIONS, PATROLS AND OTHER ACTIVITIES TO DENY THE USE OF THAT SECTOR TO THE ENEMY.
- (2) PROVIDE A PLATOON (REIN) TO OUTPOST AND PROVIDE SECURITY FOR THE GOLDEN GATE BRIDGE.
- (3) DAILY, PROVIDE A SQUAD (REIN) AS SECURITY FOR THE STEEP ROAD LEADING SOUTH TO ROUTE 4 AND ALONG ROUTE 4 WEST TOWARDS 3/7. DETAILS OF ROAD SWEEP PROCEDURES WILL BE CONTAINED IN A SEPARATE DIRECTIVE.

F. 81MM MORTAR PLATOON

- (1) TWO SECTIONS DIRECT SUPPORT. SEE ANNEX A
- (2) SEE ANNEX A (TASK ORGANIZATION).
- (3) BE PREPARED TO REVERT TO GENERAL SUPPORT.
- (4) BE PREPARED TO DISPLACE.

G. 106MM RE PLATOON

- (1) ONE SECTION DIRECT SUPPORT. SEE ANNEX A
- (2) BE PREPARED TO DISPLACE.
- (3) BE PREPARED TO PROVIDE SECTIONS TO RIFLE COMPANIES IN A DIRECT SUPPORT ROLE.

H. BTRY E 5/11

- (1) GENERAL SUPPORT
- (2) BE PREPARED TO DISPLACE

I. 106MM MORTAR BTRY 3/11

- (1) GENERAL SUPPORT
- (2) BE PREPARED TO DISPLACE

J. 2ND PLAT, CO B 1ST TANK BN. NO CHANGEK. 2ND PLAT, CO B, 3RD AIRBORNE BN. NO CHANGEL. 1ST PLAT, CO E, 1ST RECON BN. NO CHANGEM. 3RD PLAT, CO A, 5TH AIR BN. NO CHANGEN. PROVISIONAL SUPPORT UNIT (-). NO CHANGEO. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS A NO CHANGE

- (1) ANNEX B (OPERATIONS OVERLAY)
- (2) FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION IN ACCORDANCE WITH REF C, D AND ANNEX D (SUPPORTING ARMS).
- (3) AIR SUPPORT IN ACCORDANCE WITH REF C, D AND ANNEX D (SUPPORTING ARMS).
- (4) MAXIMUM USE OF SUPPORTING ARMS IS DIRECTED.
- (5) DESTROY ALL COMMUNICATIONS, SHELTERS AND DEFENSIVE POSITIONS IN SECTORS.
- (6) OPERATION ORDERS, PATROL ROUTES, AMBUSH SITES, ETC. WILL BE SUBMITTED TO THIS HQ 72 HRS IN ADVANCE.
- (7) ALL PATROLS, AMBUSHES AND SIMILAR ACTIVITIES WILL, UPON RETURN TO BASE, BE DEBRIEFED BY AN OFFICER AND A REPORT IN THE FORMAT OF ANNEX E PREPARED. A COPY OF THE COMPLETED REPORT WILL BE FORWARDED TO THIS HQ WITHIN 24 HRS OF RETURN OR ACTIVITY TO BASE.
- (8) UNIFORM RICE CONTROL AGENTS AUTH MINIMUM DOWN WIND HAZARD TO FRIENDLIES AND NONCOMBATANTS.
- (9) PYROTECHNICS AND COLORED SMOKE
  - (A) WHITE STAR CLUSTER / CHECK FIRE
  - (B) COLOR SMOKE (COLOR DESIGNATED) TO MARK FRIENDLY POSITIONS OR FRIENDLY LINES / FLANKS.

- (10) GRID DESIGNATIONS ARE AT AND WILL BE USED IN TRANSMISSION OF ALL GRID COORDINATES.
- (11) THRUST POINTS, ANNEX B (OPERATIONS OVERLAY)
- (12) PASSWORDS AND COUNTERSIGNS, ANNEX C (INTELLIGENCE).
- (13) RULES OF ENGAGEMENT, REF C AND D.
- (14) TREATMENT OF NONCOMBATANTS, SUSPECTS, DETAINEES AND POW'S REF F.
- (15) ALL S UADS/PATROLS WILL CARRY MINIMUM OF TWO 60 FT LENGTHS OF ROPE.
- (16) ALL BLT VEHICLES MOVING OVER ROADS WITHIN THE BLT TAOR WILL BE SANDBAGGED TO MINIMIZE INJURIES TO VEHICLE AND OCCUPANTS FROM MINES. ALL PERSONNEL TRAVELLING IN VEHICLES WITHIN THE TAOR WILL WEAR A HELMET AND BODY ARMOR, UPPER TORSO.
- (17) ALL SIGNIFICANT EVENTS WILL BE REPORTED IMMEDIATELY. IN THOSE CASES WHEN COMPLETE DETAILS ARE NOT IMMEDIATELY AVAILABLE, AN INITIAL SPOT REPORT WILL BE MADE, FOLLOWED UP WITHIN 60 MIN BY FULL DETAILS.
- (18) THIS ORDER EFFECTIVE ON ORDER.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. NO CHANGE

4. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS

A. IN ACCORDANCE WITH REF C, D, AND G.

B. REPORT LOCATION OF CP'S WHEN ESTABLISHED/CHANGED.

NEEL A. NELSON

LIEUTENANT COLONEL, U. S. MARINE CORPS  
COMMANDING

ATTACHMENTS:

- A - PLatoon ORGANIZATION
- B - OPERATIONS OVERLAY
- C - INTELLIGENCE
- D - SUPPORTING ARMS
- E - PATROL REPORT FORM
- Z - DISTRIBUTION

ENCLOSURE (3)

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Annex A (Task Organization) to Frag Order 86-68

Time Zone: Hotel

BLT 2/7

LtCol NELSON

H&S Co (-)  
Det, Comm PlatCo E (Rein)

Capt. NELSON

Co E  
Det, H&S Co  
Det, Med Plat  
Det, Comm Plat  
Sec, 81mm Mort Plat  
FO Tn, 81mm Mort Plat  
FO Tn, Btry H, 3rd Bn, 11th Mar  
Sqd, 2nd Plat, Co C, 1st Engr Bn  
HST, 1st Shore Party BnCo F (Rein)

Capt. WELPOTT

Co F  
Det, H&S Co  
Det, Med Plat  
Det, Comm Plat  
Sec, 81mm Mort Plat  
FO Tn, 81mm Mort Plat  
FO Tn, Btry H, 3rd Bn, 11th Mar  
Sqd, 2nd Plat, Co C, 1st Engr Bn  
HST Tn, 1st Shore Party BnCo G (Rein)

Capt. LATORRE

Co G  
Det, H&S Co  
Det Med Plat  
Det, Comm Plat  
FO Tn, 81mm Mort Plat  
FO Tn, Btry H, 3rd Bn, 11th Mar  
Sqd, 2nd Plat, Co C, 1st Engr Bn  
HST Tn, 1st Shore Party Bn



Co H (Rein)

Capt. HOLM

Co H  
 Det, H&S Co  
 Det, Med Plat  
 Det, Comm Plat  
 FO TM, 81mm Mort Plat  
 Sqd, 2nd Plat, Co C, 1st Engr Bn  
 HST Tn, 1st Shore Party Bn

81mm Mort Plat (-) (Rein)

1stLt. MCMAHON

81 mm Mort Plat  
 Det, Med Plat

106 RR Plat (-) (Rein)

SSgt. SEYMORE

106 RR Plat (-)  
 Det, Med Plat

Btry H, (Rein), 3rd Bn, 11th Mar

Capt. JAMES

Mortar Btry, 3rd Bn, 11th Mar

Capt. RIORDAN

1st Plat, Co E, 1st Recon Bn

1st Lt. MCKLUSKI

Provisional Support Unit (-)

1stLt. LUCKAWECZ

LSU, FLC  
 Det, BMU NGB  
 Det, 1st Shore Party Bn (-)  
 2nd Plat, Co C, 1st Engr Bn (-)

*Nel A Nelson*  
 NEL A NELSON


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 Commanding

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PLANET ~~2/7~~

Annex: B (Operations Overlay) to Frog Order 86-68  
Maps: 1:50,000 DAI LOC STR 2 6520 IV 3 STRS L7014  
Time Zone: H



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Lieutenant Colonel U.S. Marine Corps  
Commanding

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ANNEX C (Intelligence) to Frag Order 86-68

Ref: (a) BnO 3800.1  
 (b) MAP AMS RVN 1:50,000 SERIES L7014 Sheet 6640 IV

Time Zone: Hotel

1. Summary of Enemy Situation

- a. Enemy units believed to be operating in the vicinity and their latest reported positions are: C5 Sapper Co (957575); 236th NVA Regt CP (959565); One UI Bn, 38th Regt (969575); 36th Bn (974558); C1st Co, 689th Sapper Bn (992614).
- b. See Appendix 1 for recent sightings.

2. EEI's

- a. Determine what enemy units are in the area of operations to include size, locations, equipment and unit identification.
- b. Determine if enemy will defend in area or withdraw.
- c. Determine the locations of storage, rocket and harbor sites to include size, type of construction and period of use.
- d. Determine if area is used as an infiltration route. Include location of trails, and how well used.
- e. Determine if the enemy has the capability to reinforce the units suspected in the area of operations. If so, what units, where, and in what strength.

3. Intelligence Acquisition Tasks.

- a. Co's will provide information as obtained on enemy ground forces, fortifications, storage sites and harbor sites.
- b. Co's will conduct recon patrols, OP's and LP's as the tactical situation permits.
- c. Co's will ensure that overlays and drawings are made of all trails, harbor sites, storage sites and fortified areas.

4. Measures for Handling Captured Personnel, Documents and Material.

- a. All detainees will be handled in accordance with reference (a).

- b. Captured documents will be handled in accordance with reference (a).
  - c. Captured material will be handled in accordance with reference (a).
  - d. Battalion S-2 is responsible for planning and coordination of the collection, safeguarding, administration and safeguarding of all detainees. Additionally, Companies will ensure that all captured equipment and detainees are properly tagged prior to being evacuated to the rear.
5. Documents and/or equipment required.
- a. Reference (b) is designated as the standard map for this operation.
  - b. Maps will be issued prior to execution of this order.
6. Counterintelligence.
- a. Camouflage and light discipline will be strictly enforced.
  - b. Challenge and passwords
    - (1) Challenge and password. See Appendix 3.
    - (2) Passwords will be in effect for a 24 hour period covering 1200 to 1200 daily.
7. Reports and Distribution.
- a. Spot reports concerning contacts with the enemy, finding or capturing of any enemy equipment, sites, etc., will be reported to the Bn S-3 info Bn S-2.
  - b. A FLASH report will be sent directly to the Bn S-2 concerning any use of gas by the enemy.
  - c. Mortar, bomb and shell reports will be made in accordance with reference (a).
8. Miscellaneous Instructions.
- a. Radio operators will report all attempts of enemy interference on our radio nets to the Bn S-2. Reports will include time of start and finish, frequency and type of interference used.

Use interpreters when possible to determine the nature of any foreign traffic on the radio nets.

b. See Appendix 2 for Astronomical Data.

*William A. Nelson*

WILLIAM A. NELSON  
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps  
Commanding

APPENDIX

- 1 - Recent sightings and incidents in AO
- 2 - Astronomical Data
- 3 - Primary Challenge and Passwords

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APPENDIX 1 (Recent Sightings and Incidents) to APPENDIX C (Intelligence)  
 To Frag Order

<u>Coord</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Sighting/Incident</u>
955601	20Oct68	Squad on patrol received 4 rounds small arms fire
975605	17Oct68	HqCo, 7th Marines Bridge Security observed 3 to 5 enemy in tree line. Fired .50 cal and 106 RR. Observed secondary explosion.
966604	9Oct68	Bridge Security heard approximately 20 rounds small arms fire and received approximately 5 rounds small arms fire.
966604	10Oct68	HqCo Security Plt observed an "A" frame floating toward bridge. Struck bridge and exploded resulting in damage to bridge.
963602	11Oct68	Bridge security observed 2 boats moving down SW side of river. Fired small arms, 50 cal and LAW. Destroyed one boat.
963602	18Oct68	Bridge security heard movement, did not physically sight enemy.
954595	30Oct68	Squad observed 3 enemy with weapons. Captured 4 ChiCom grenades and a medic kit.
982624	21Oct68	Truck exploded mine emplaced in road. Previously conducted road sweep same morning resulted in discovery of 4 emplaced mines.

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 Commanding

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APPENDIX 2 (Astronomical Data) to ANNEX C (Intelligence) of Frag Order 86-68

Time Zone: Hotel

October

<u>DATE</u>	<u>RISE</u>	<u>SUNRISE</u>	<u>SUNSET</u>	<u>EECT</u>	<u>MOONRISE</u>	<u>MOONSET</u>	<u>% ILLUM</u>	<u>PHASE</u>
22	0618	0641	1823	1846	0648	1838	00	
23	0618	0641	1822	1845	0750	1927	02	
24	0618	0641	1821	1844	0857	2021	06	New Moon
25	0619	0642	1821	1844	1005	2122	12	
26	0619	0642	1820	1843	1111	2227	23	
27	0619	0642	1820	1843	1213	2331	33	
28	0620	0643	1819	1842	1308	-----	48	1st Qtr
29	0620	0643	1819	1842	1356	0034	55	
30	0620	0643	1818	1841	1439	0133	66	
31	0621	0644	1818	1841	1518	0228	75	

November

1	0621	0644	1818	1841	1553	0320	84	1st Qtr
2	0621	0644	1817	1840	1628	0410	91	
3	0622	0645	1817	1840	1702	0458	96	
4	0622	0645	1816	1839	1738	0547	99	
5	0623	0646	1816	1839	1815	0637	100	Full Moon
6	0623	0646	1816	1839	1856	0728	99	
7	0623	0646	1815	1838	1940	0821	97	
8	0624	0647	1815	1838	2028	0914	93	
9	0624	0647	1815	1838	2119	1006	87	
10	0625	0648	1815	1838	2211	1057	80	
11	0625	0648	1814	1837	2305	1145	72	
12	0625	0648	1814	1837	2379	1230	63	
13	0626	0649	1814	1837	-----	1311	54	Last Qtr
14	0626	0649	1814	1837	0051	1350	44	
15	0627	0650	1814	1837	0144	1428	34	

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ANNEX 3 (Primary Challenge and Passwords) to ANNEX C (Intelligence)  
 of Frag Order 86-68

Time Zone: Hotel

<u>DATE</u>	<u>PRIMARY CHALLENGE</u>	<u>PASSWORD</u>
22 Oct 68	ORANGE	CARE
23 Oct 68	MOON	BIKE
24 Oct 68	GUEW	BRICK
25 Oct 68	EMBRACE	GLAD
26 Oct 68	BLADE	DRUG
27 Oct 68	COACH	OTHER
28 Oct 68	PINT	PAIN

Note: Challenge and Password for subsequent date will be issued when received.

*Neil A. Nelson*  
 NEIL A. NELSON

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Annex D (Supporting Arms) to Frag Order 86-68

- Ref. (a) BLT 2/7 OP PLAN 1-68 (NOTAL)  
 (b) NWIP 22-2  
 (c) FMFM 7-1  
 (d) 9th MAB Order P 3500.3 (SOP for FSCC)  
 (e) FMFM 3-1

Time Zone: Hotel

Task Organization: Annex A (Task Organization)

1. SITUATION

a. General

- (1) Reference (a), (b), and especially Annex I (Rules of Engagement) to reference (a) will be closely adhered to in the control and coordination of supporting arms.

b. Enemy Forces

- (1) Annex C (Intelligence)  
 (2) Current INTSUMS

c. Friendly Forces

- (1) Annex A (Task Organization)  
 (2) Annex B (Operation Overlay)

2. MISSION

The BLT FSCC plans and coordinates the fires of one or more of the Major Supporting Arms with the plan of operations of the BLT to provide for troop safety and safety of friendly aircraft from the effects of the BLT support means.

3. EXECUTION

~~MISSION (3)~~

- a. Control and coordination of supporting arms will be by the BLT FSCC.


- b. Close coordination and liaison will be effected with adjacent command and civilian authorities to insure the safety of friendly forces and indigenous personnel in the BLT's area of Operations.

4. Coordinating Instructions

No change from ref (a).

5. Command and Communications-Electronics

No change from ref (a).



W. A. NELSON

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Appendix 1 (Air Operations) to Annex D (Supporting Arms) to Frag Order 86-68

Ref: (a) Battalion Landing Team Op Plan 1-68  
 (b) COMUSMACV Directive Number 95-8

Time Zone: Hotel

1. SITUATION

a. General

Reference (b) established guidance, procedures and conditions on the employment of U.S. Military Air Power in RVN.

b. Enemy Forces

- (1) See Annex C (Intelligence)
- (2) See Current INTSUMS

c. Friendly Forces

- (1) See Annex B (Operations Overlay)
- (2) See FMIP-41 for conditions of aircraft readiness

2. MISSION

To Coordinate Air Delivery of Fire Power with all other types of Fire Power to obtain the optimum Fire Plan as well as provide resupply and support of ground forces and MEDEVACS of injured personnel.

a. See Annex A (Operations Overlay)

b. Restrictive Fire Plans will be in accordance with Annex D (Supporting Arms) and Ref (a).

c. Helicopter primary and alternate LZ's will normally be preflared prior to landing of troops.

d. Air strikes within the TACR must be under positive control of one of the following (listed in order of preference):

- (1) TACA, FAC
- (2) TAC-10

- e. The UTM Military Grid Reference System will be used for target and LZ identification.
- f. All units down to squad size will carry both air marking panels and smoke for marking front lines, friendly positions and LZ's.
- g. HST will assign a two man section to each company. They will provide control of LZ's for MEDEVACs and resupply missions.
- h. Night LZ marking will be done by all available methods. Minimum platoon requirements for night operations is three flashlights and one Strobe.
- i. Use Standard Mission Request Forms for all missions.
- j. Submit routine helicopter and fixed wing requests by 1100 daily for the following days employment. Submit priority helicopter requests by 1600 daily for the following days utilization. Emergency missions will be handled ASAP.
- k. Helicopters will be available for MEDEVACs and resupply as the Tactical situation permits.
- l. Mark targets for air strikes with White Phosphorous if possible.
3. Command and Communications-Electronics

2/7 TACP 42.0 M-1 Native Bird 14

2/7 HST 45.8 M-125 Frosty Gold

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Appendix 2 (Artillery) to Annex D (Supporting Arms) to Frag Order 86-68

Ref: (a) BLT 2/7 Operation Plan 1-68 (NOTAL)  
 (b) TFM 7-4  
 (c) 9th MAB Order P3500.3  
 (d) Firing chart, Grid sheet 1-25,000

Time Zone: Hotel

Task Organization: Annex A

1. SITUATION

a. General. Reference (a) and Annex D (Fire Support Coordination) to Frag Order 86-68, will be closely adhered to in the utilization of artillery fires.

b. Enemy Forces

- (1) Annex C (Intelligence)
- (2) Current Intsuss

c. Friendly Forces

- (1) Annex A (Task Organization)
- (2) Annex B (Operations Overlay)

2. MISSION

a. Provide direct support fires in BLT 2/7 area of operations

3. EXECUTION

a. Concept of artillery employment

- (1) Direct support will be provided by the 3rd Bn, 11th Marines.
- (2) Battery H 3rd Bn, 11th Marines and Mortar Battery, 3rd Bn, 11th Marines.
  - (a) Provide priority of fires to BLT 2/7.
  - (b) Establish air sentries in firing position when friendly aircraft approach the danger zone. Check fire when aircraft are in the danger zone

(c) Coordinate organization of local security with adjacent unit commanders to prevent interruption of fires.

4. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS

a. No change from Reference (a).

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS

a. No change from Reference (a).



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7th Marines	4	1-4
OPG 79.5	3	5-7
1st Marines	3	8-10
5th Marines	2	11-12
3rd Bn, 7th MARINES	3	13-15
BJT 27	20	16-35

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- K. Condition of patrol including disposition of any dead or wounded.
- L. Conclusions and recommendations: (including to what extent the mission was accomplished and recommendations as to patrol equipment and tactics).

---

(Signature, grade/rank and organization/unit of patrol leader)

- M. Additional remarks by interrogator:

---

(Signature, grade/rank and organization/unit of interrogator).

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Annex E (Patrol Report Form) to Frag Order 86-68

Ref: Frag Order 86-68

Time Zone: Hotel

Patrol Report

Designation of Patrol \_\_\_\_\_ Date \_\_\_\_\_

To \_\_\_\_\_

Maps \_\_\_\_\_

- A. Size and composition of patrol.
- B. Task.
- C. Time of departure.
- D. Time of return.
- E. Routes (out and back).
- F. Terrain: (Description of the terrain - dry, swampy, thickly weeded, high brush, rocky, deepness of ravines and draws condition of bridges as to type, size and strength, effect on armor and wheeled vehicles etc).
- G. Enemy Strength, disposition, condition of defenses, equipment, weapons attitude, morale, exact location, movement and any shift dispositions. Time activity was observed, coordinates here activity occurred.
- H. Any map corrections:
- I. Miscellaneous info:
- J. Results of encounters with enemy (Enemy prisoners and disposition, identifications, enemy casualties, captured documents and equipment, etc).

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